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Few artworks in the history of twentieth-century art have elicited such indignant and 
visceral responses as those produced in Germany under Hitler and the Third Reich (1933–
45). The blatant propaganda and heinous ideology represented by the painting, sculpture, 
architecture, and visual ephemera of this period have worked against its categorization as 
art. The Nazi dictates on content and style–a naturalist-realism based on the servile copying 
of nature or a photograph–demonstrably suppressed modernist and expressionist-oriented 
creativity. Moreover, for the informed viewer, knowledge of the actual violence, and 
genocide perpetrated by the regime endows the imagery with an aura of evil that both 
fascinates and disturbs. Yet, the continued interest in the rise and fall of Nazi Germany 
rests largely on the belief that the history of the Third Reich has lessons to impart not just 
to subsequent generations of Germans, but also to the world at large.1 The art produced 
under National Socialism is crucial to those lessons. The history of its censorship and 
reception in Germany over the postwar decades–the subject of this thesis–has larger 
ramifications with regard to the ongoing contextualization and display of politically 
charged art elsewhere in the world.   
Images have always had the power to elicit profound emotional responses: from 
adulation and desire to disgust, fear. In turn, the values we ascribe to cultural objects are 
largely responsible for their fate.2 Paintings and sculptures deemed beautiful or innovative 
 
1 Eric Michaud, The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004). 
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of cultural relationships to images see, 
David Freedberg’s, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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are preserved for subsequent generations and the collective good under the definition of 
cultural patrimony; those considered inconsequential are neglected; and those that provoke 
loathing are overlooked, hidden, or destroyed. In his 2007 book The Power of Images, 
David Freedberg wrote: 
On some occasions, iconoclasm may seem chiefly to spring from a general 
concern about the nature and status of images, about their ontology, and 
about their function (or, indeed, the possibility of function). On other 
occasions, one might claim, there seems to be less concern about ontology 
(except, of course, among the artists), as in the French and Russian 
revolutions. In other words, the motivation seems much more clearly 
political. The aim is to pull down whatever symbolizes—stands for—the 
old and usually repressive order, the order which one wishes to replace with 
a new and better one.3 
The fall of the Third Reich marked a period of intense iconoclasm, and the range of 
emotional responses felt by military officers and later West Germans, as discussed in this 
text, largely determined the fate of objects and the ensuing debates over their function as 
patrimony and/or propaganda. In the immediate postwar period, the victorious Allies as 
well as those who fell victim to National Socialism (or felt guilty for supporting it) aimed 
to destroy the extant, visual embodiments of the regime’s oppression and terror. 
Entnazifierung (denazification) laid the framework for ridding Germany of Nazi ideology. 
The first part of denazification centered on culpability, with the Allies holding Nazi leaders 
and party members accountable for their actions through tribunals and other legal actions. 
The second part of denazification focused on purging all elements of Nazism from 
Germany, including the destruction and removal of all visual signs and symbols of the 
party, from art and literature to items of ephemera, in order to stop the perpetuation of 
German militarism and Nazism. National Socialist visual culture promulgated the racist 
and anti-democratic ideologies that led to Nazi genocide; its dogmatically anti-modernist 
 
3 Ibid., 389–90. 
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style symbolized the totalitarian reach of the dictatorship and its violent repression of 
creative freedom and civil liberties. The authorities believed, with reason, that the 
exhibition of such images would reignite Nazi sympathies. A justifiable fear of the power 
of Nazi art led to its concealment and destruction in the aftermath of World War II.  
Countless buildings and reliefs bearing Nazi symbols were the targets of 
spontaneous outbursts of iconoclasm.4 An infamous photograph from the Mauthausen 
Concentration Camp (figure 1) shows freed prisoners destroying a Reich eagle and 
swastika atop the gates of the camp. The prisoners’ animus was not directed toward the 
inanimate material object per se, but against its symbolism throughout the brutal Third 
Reich. Iconoclasm is a cathartic gesture. Although not every German was a card-carrying 
member of the Nazi party, many everyday Germans had been complicit with National 
Socialism’s reign of terror, and after the end of the war they took to the streets and 
destroyed Nazi emblems, symbols, and monuments in their cities. For example, in June 
1945 numerous Nazi memorials were defaced across the city of Munich. Citizens 
vandalized the Feldherrnhalle (Field Marshals' Hall) with graffiti and tore down and 
demolished the adjacent Nazi memorials on the Odeonsplatz.5 The iconoclastic actions can 
be ascribed to a sense of relief felt by Germans who were glad the war was over; they had 
accepted their defeat. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch wrote in the The Culture of Defeat: On 
National Trauma, Mourning, and Recover, conquered populaces often direct collective 
consciousness towards hope and confidence. In this case, hope and confidence towards the 
 
4 A number of photographs from the Bavarian State Library photograph archive in 
Munich show destroyed Nazi monuments. See, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 
München/Fotoarchiv Walz, walz-0575. For additional lists of buildings destroyed in the 
American zone, such as official lists of Nazi artworks removed from Munich city 
property in 1946. See, Stadtarchiv Munich, BuR 2277. 
5 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, “Interfoto/Friedrich Rauch. 00578725” and “Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek München/Fotoarchiv WAlz, walz-0575” 
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future did not involve National Socialism and the vandals felt a sense of power and 
hopefulness by defacing symbols of the former regime.6 
Today, some seventy-five years after the fall of the Third Reich, one can visit a 
municipal history museum in Germany and view a display of Nazi “memorabilia,” ranging 
from postcards and pamphlets to painting and sculpture. How, in the wake of Germany’s 
defeat at the hands of the Allied forces, did these materials survive into the present, and 
how did they come to reside in museums? This thesis explores how some Nazi architecture, 
fine arts and ephemera survived the postwar period, were gradually rehabilitated through 
study and exhibition, and subsequently entered German museums to be publicly displayed 
under the categories of historical documents and “visual culture,” rather than “fine” art. 
The chapters flow chronologically in order to survey how collective memory and the 
nation’s relationship to the Nazi past changed over time and with it, the study and reception 
of National Socialist art.  
The Allied occupation of Germany played an important role in both the destruction 
and preservation of Nazi art and visual culture. Although much of the literature discussing 
art and the occupation has focused on the restitution of artworks stolen by the Nazis, in 
particular Lynn H. Nicholas’s seminal 1995 book The Rape of Europa: The Fate of 
Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War, few texts have 
addressed how these efforts ultimately protected and preserved the art created by the Reich.  
In 1946, the American and British occupying governments established art depositories, 
known as the Central Collection Points (CCP) to store artworks uncovered by their 
restitution efforts. The U.S. and British militaries uncovered both hordes of art looted by 
 
6 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and 
Recovery (New York: Picador, 2004), 10–11. 
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the Nazis and troves of National Socialist paintings and sculpture. Both Nazi materials and 
stolen masterpieces entered the CCPs. Although the Allies focused primarily on the 
restitution of the stolen masterpieces in their care, they also formalized a unified plan (as 
part of their denazification efforts) to destroy any propaganda materials that could be used 
to perpetuate German militarism, including fine art. However, when it came time for the 
destruction of the Nazi paintings and sculptures in the care of the U.S. CCP, some officers 
argued for their preservation over iconoclasm. Many of the U.S. Military officials working 
on the restitution efforts and in the CCPs were trained as art historians; they had been 
recruited for their expertise. These officers made the case that the works in their care could 
potentially hold historical and pedagogical value; they had the foresight to perceive that 
one day the vilified artwork might be an instructive means for the study of why the Nazis 
came to power and achieved a totalitarian state. Although the Allies worked together to 
restitute stolen artworks, the approach in the Eastern and the Western zones towards Nazi 
visual culture was vastly different. The Soviets helped identify and, in some cases, 
provided locations of Nazi art to the Americans. However, due to the different approaches 
taken by East and West Germany towards confronting the Nazi past in the years following 
the occupation, a detailed discussion of Soviet involvement in the preservation of Nazi 
visual culture is outside the scope of this thesis. As addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, 
the U.S. occupation and the art historians working for the military were instrumental in the 
preservation of Nazi art and instigated the line of reasoning for these materials to eventually 
be considered as part of the national German patrimony.   
In 1949, as a result of the Cold War, Germany was split into two. Aligned with 
Europe and the United States, the West became the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany or the FRG), and the East, under the power of the Soviet Union, the German 
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Democratic Republic (East Germany or the GDR). After this ideological, geopolitical, and 
territorial division, little attention was paid to the art produced under Nazi Germany. The 
two respective nations worked to distance their identities from the Nazi past. Under the 
“anti-Fascist” rhetoric of Communist government directives, the GDR did not reckon with 
its culpability until German reunification in 1990. The FRG, however, began a process of 
collective reckoning and atonement in the 1960s, as part of the continued denazification.  
Under the occupation, Entnazifierung (denazification) focused on holding Nazi 
officials accountable for the genocide and atrocities committed. It also involved ridding 
Germany of anything that could perpetuate German militarism. Nonetheless, holding all 
involved in the mass atrocities proved difficult, as many Germans had been members of 
the Nazi party or complicit with the Third Reich, but had not been directly involved in the 
crimes against humanity. As a result, the Allies were unable to bring all perpetrators to 
justice during the occupation (100,000 officials were held accountable).7 Thus, in the 
1950s, after Germany’s divide, many former Nazis returned to positions of power across 
the FRG. Nevertheless, the Allied implementation of the denazification process, coupled 
with the FRG’s new liberal democracy, resulted in a new collective consciousness: West 
Germany engaged in Vergangenheitsbewältigung, “to come to terms with a traumatic 
past.”8 Denazification gave West Germany a unique historical and political tenor, placing 
collective consciousness, ideologically, at war with the immediate past, and it was 
overwhelmingly difficult to reconcile the Third Reich with the new democratic Federal 
 
7 Jeffrey Herf, "Divided Memory Revisited: The Nazi Past in West Germany and in 
Postwar Palestine." In Remembrance, History, and Justice: Coming to Terms with 
Traumatic Pasts in Democratic Societies, edited by Tismaneanu Vladimir and Iacob 
Bogdan C., 103-24. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2015. 
Accessed November 21, 2020. doi:10.7829/j.ctt19z399m.7. 107. 
8 Ibid. 
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Republic. A uniquely West German phenomena, Vergangenheitsbewältigung changed 
over time as intellectual and political life grappled with the crimes of the Third Reich.  
A first moment of reckoning occurred with the 1956 scandal involving the Cannes 
Film Festival’s decision to censor the documentary film Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) 
by French film director Alain Resnais. The film juxtaposed archival material of the 
Holocaust with present day footage, ultimately removing a distinction between the Nazi 
past and the present. The sense of distinction between past and present, which had been 
championed by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1963, 
was further challenged by the highly publicized trial of the war criminal Adolf Eichmann 
in 1961. Moreover, the veil of historical amnesia lifted even further in 1966 with the release 
of the Nazi architect Albert Speer from Spandau prison. The student movements of the late 
1960s further accelerated the demand for accountability.9  West Germany’s interest in 
reckoning with the recent Nazi past remained fraught during the 1960s because the 
perception of victimhood extended beyond the groups explicitly persecuted by the regime: 
many Germans believed that due to the traumas of war and postwar depravation they too 
had suffered due to the Nazi regime. Moreover, former Nazis still held positions of 
institutional power.  
Within the cultural realm, generational change prompted a shift in the desire and 
obligation to assess Nazi art and the complicity of artists, critics, dealers, and museum 
curators. As former supporters of National Socialism retired from teaching and museum 
positions, a younger generation of art historians emerged. They were too young to have 
participated in the rise of the regime, sustained it, or to have fought in the war. They began 
 
9 Paul Jaskot, The Nazi Perpetrator: Postwar German Art and the Politics of the Right 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 6. 
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to bristle at the suppression of the past and wanted to understand the origins of the Nazi 
mechanisms of power.  Such new attitudes led to the publication of seminal texts such as 
Hildegard Brenner’s 1963 Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus (The Art Policy of 
National Socialism) and the first major postwar exhibition on the art and aesthetics of the 
Third Reich: Kunst im 3. Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung (Art in the Third Reich: 
Documents of Subjugation) mounted in 1974.10   
  This exhibition marked the first time since the fall of National Socialism that the 
West German public was able to view–and confront–the visual culture of this reviled 
period. Imagery depicting or referencing Nazism had been banned by the West German 
government in 1956, when the FRG’s Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) enacted section 
86a. This law outlawed the use or display of symbols of “unconstitutional organizations, 
"including National Socialism. However, there was a clause that allowed the display of 
Nazi symbols “if the means of propaganda or the act serves to further civil enlightenment, 
to avert unconstitutional aims, to promote art or science, research or teaching, reporting 
about current historical events or similar purposes” –which thus allowed the organizers to 
exhibit National Socialist images. 11  Organized by Georg Bussmann, director of the 
Frankfurt Kunstverein; Berthold Hinz, assistant professor at the Institute for Art History, 
University of Frankfurt; the academic and political scientist Iring Festscher; and a group 
 
10 Hildegard Brenner, Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus. Reinback bai Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1963.According to study done by the Freie Universität Berlin many of 
Hildegard Brenner’s primary sources for Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus came from 
the Central State Archive in the GDR. See Freie Universität Berlin”About the Research 
History.” Database “Entartete Kunst”. November 26, 2009. Accessed May 22, 2018. 
http://www.geschkult.fu-
berlin.de/en/e/db_entart_kunst/geschichte/forschungsgeschichte/index.html. 
11 Gerhard Dannemann, German Law Archive. Accessed November 11, 2020. 
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=752#86a. 
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of art historians studying at the University of Frankfurt, it opened at the Kunstverein in 
Frankfurt am Main in 1974, and traveled throughout the FRG, stopping in Hamburg, 
Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen, Wuppertal-Elberfeld, and Berlin. Despite the presumed, 
pervasive fear of Nazi images, the exhibition’s organizing committee believed that the 
public needed to see and confront the art of the Third Reich. While scholars such as Pamela 
Potter and Silke von Berswordt-Wallrabe note the importance of Kunst im 3. Reich: 
Dokumente der Unterwerfung as a watershed in the evolution of collective memory, they 
do not go into detail regarding the exact items in the show, the exhibition design, or the 
critical reactions. 12  Chapter 2 documents these aspects and why the event provoked 
controversy and heated debates about Nazi visual culture and its fate.13 The curators framed 
the exhibition by correlating documents and propaganda imperative to specific visual 
images; it was far too early and the methodologies did not yet exist for the public to 
consider the easel paintings that were literally brought out of hiding for the show as both 
“art” and propaganda.14  Scholars and some members of the general public overwhelmingly 
agreed that Nazi art did not have a place in museums, because it was nothing more than 
propaganda and many did not feel there was value in understanding how imagery had 
served to promote Nazi ideologies.15    
 
12 Pamela Potter, Art of Suppression: Confronting the Nazi Past in Histories of the Visual 
and Performing Arts. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016, 149 and Silke 
Von Berswordt-Wallrabe, Jörg-Uwe Neumann, and Agnes Tieze, Artige Kunst: Kunst 
und Politik im Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld: Kerber, Christof, 2016), 196. 
13 Georg Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung (Frankfurt 
am Main: Zweitausendeins, 1980), 2. 
14 George Bussman and Heinz Schütz, “Transformation Und Wiederkehr,” Kunstforum 
International (1988): 99, accessed July 23, 2018, 
https://kunstforum.de/lesen/artikel.aspx?a=095003. 
15 Ibid., 204. 
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Another decade followed before West Germany once again confronted its Nazi 
past; new assessments towards Nazi visual culture developed from renewed debates 
surrounding the role of Nazi art in the realm of aesthetics, despite the 1956 Criminal Code. 
Chapters 3 and 4 look at critical developments in the 1980s, some fifty years after Hitler’s 
rise to power in 1933. This decade marked an increasing tolerance toward Nazi visual 
culture within the FRG and the United States. With the passage of time came distance from 
the regime and those directly responsible for the crimes it perpetuated. Discussions 
surrounding the validity of Nazi art and ephemera as items of high culture were revived 
along with debates on the aesthetic value of Nazi visual culture.  
In 1981 the United States decided to repatriate a number of National Socialist 
artworks to the FRG. After years of review and careful selection, 6,100 works were 
returned to the FRG in 1986.16 Although a number of scholars refer to the return of these 
Nazi artworks in their texts on the history of the reception of Nazi imagery, they do not 
document the machinations behind their return. Chapter 3 details the story of repatriation 
efforts spearheaded by Republican Congressman G. William Whitehurst from Virginia, 
who, after learning that a painting hanging in his office was made by a German soldier in 
World War II, discovered and advocated for the return of the German War Art Collection. 
This chapter sheds light on the provenance of Nazi art after the war. The U.S. involvement 
in Germany at the end of the war and again in the 1980s-when these artworks were 
repatriated to the Federal Republic, despite the later not requesting the return–demonstrates 
how the United States preserved Nazi art and ascribed value on these works. Despite the 
 
16 Andrew Decker, “Nazi Art Returns to Germany,” ARTnews 83, no. 9 (November 
1984): 143–44. 
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return of these works, the FRG did not wish to confront the imagery and instead opted to 
store them away from the public in a warehouse in Bonn. 
Chapter 4 considers the motivations of two private collectors, their markedly 
opposed criteria for rehabilitating the art of the Nazi period, and the respective public 
reactions to their endeavors. In 1986, the same year the repatriated works returned to West 
Germany, debates erupted throughout the country regarding the aesthetic value of Nazi art. 
At the center of the controversy were Peter Ludwig and his wife, Irene Monheim, who 
made headlines that year when they commissioned Hitler’s favorite sculptor, Arno Breker 
(1900-1991) to render their portrait busts. Ludwig believed Breker to be one of the greatest 
living portrait artists and proposed that his busts should be housed in a museum in Cologne. 
Ludwig’s actions were heralded or lambasted: supporters advocated that Breker’s neo-
classicizing art deserved to be patronized on the basis of its aesthetic value, while others 
protested that it was not only retrograde, but redolent of the Aryan racial discourse of the 
Nazi era. Ludwig’s commission, and commentary that art should be removed from the 
artist’s biography (he argued that Breker’s work should be judged on aesthetic quality 
alone; the artist’s life or association with the Third Reich was irrelevant to the value of the 
work), served as motivation for other supports to advocate for the rehabilitation of Breker’s 
work. In the end, the two commissioned busts were not publicly shown in a museum in 
Germany, and instead remained a part of Ludwig’s private collection until his death, after 
which they were placed on long-term loan to the Ludwig Museum in Budapest, Hungary.  
Ultimately, the controversy reinforced the anxiety around artists tied to National Socialism.  
The incorporation of Nazi art within art museums could be seen as a form of moral 
relativizing, of lessening the crimes of Nazism. 
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By contrast, across the Atlantic, an entirely new way of contextualizing politically 
explosive material emerged under the rubric of “visual culture.” This methodology accepts 
the didactic content of images and analyzes what makes them so compelling and 
convincing. The collecting philosophy and acquisitions of one man in particular, Mickey 
Wolfson, Jr., an American and Jewish philanthropist, elevated visual culture to the status 
of “propaganda arts.” In contrast to Ludwig, who proposed that art and artists could be 
appreciated apart from their political history, it was precisely history that informed 
Wolfson’s desire to collect. The “art” of propaganda addresses the fundamental premise of 
the power–and popularity–of images; it levels the hierarchy, casting an equal eye on 
traditionally elite art forms (easel painting) and mass culture (mass produced and 
disseminated, such as posters and postcards). Wolfson advocated for the study of 
ephemeral items of mass culture in order to understand how aesthetics can function on all 
levels, across mediums and vehicles of dissemination. For Wolfson, aesthetics and politics 
were inextricably linked. The history of the acceptance of Wolfson’s collection in contrast 
to the Ludwig controversy also demonstrates a broader global interest in the visual culture 
of Nazi Germany. 
The Berlin Wall fell and was destroyed on November 9, 1989; on October 3, 1990 
the two Germanies were reunited. Unification resulted in greater access to historical 
documents, the consolidation of resources and archives and the sharing of information (it 
also resulted in the acquisition of a number of Nazi era materials). For example, in 
December 1992, a delegation of German librarians and archivists met with forty Russian 
librarians in Moscow to discuss archival materials and artworks brought to Russia after 
 13 
1945.17 During these meetings, Evgeny Kuzmin, a government official responsible for the 
Russian Ministry of Culture’s library, provided German representatives with a list of books 
and art objects that had been removed from Germany after 1945. These documents detailed 
where and how these items had been disbursed and allowed for their repatriation to 
Germany. Subsequent decades saw the establishment of new history museums, on local 
and national levels, which included sections devoted to the Holocaust and to the Nazi 
period. Once forbidden and vilified, posters, paintings, and sculptures of the Third Reich 
have become, in the last two decades, mnemonic tools, brought into museum displays as 
historical and pedagogical objects, didactic or “teaching” opportunities.  Fear of the “power 
of images” has been mitigated by historical distance and contextualization. 
  
 
17 Sem C. Sutter, "The Fall of the Bibliographic Wall: Libraries and Archives in Unified 
Germany," College & Research Libraries 55, no. 5 (1994): 403-11. Accessed March 11, 
2018. doi:10.5860/crl_55_05_403. 
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Chapter One: Points of Reckoning 
 
When leafing through old photo albums, one encounters disturbing pictures 
that have shaped the common image of the war’s end. These snapshots 
rarely show actual fighting but present scenes of laughing victors and 
celebrating civilians or of skeletons in concentration camp garb and 
dejected prisoners of a defeated army. Other motifs capture broken bridges, 
torn-up roads, blown-up tanks, burnt buildings, piles of rubble, and 
anonymous bodies, representing an unimaginable level of destruction. The 
old newsreels hardly show any men, only distraught women, orphans, 
refugees, or the aged and the wounded. The yellowed photographs also 
illustrate that life continued after the catastrophe through the clearing of 
ruins, the creation of makeshift shelters, scrounging for food, and 
fraternizing with the occupiers. These images have seared themselves into 
the collective memory and dominate all recollections. 
—Konrad H. Jarausch18 
 
In the above passage, the American historian Konrad H. Jarausch attested to the misery 
and ruins in which the German people found themselves when the European arena of World 
War II ended in May 1945. Jarausch was born in Germany in 1941, in the city of 
Magdeburg, which was largely destroyed by Allied bombing. Subsequently, the Allies set 
to work building shelters and resettling the displaced. In addition to attending to these basic 
conditions of human survival, the victors attended to the preservation of valuable art, 
artifacts, and the few venerable historical monuments still standing. The complete 
devastation of the country complicated their efforts to recover and restitute looted artworks 
within Germany and in formerly German-occupied areas of Europe.  
At the same time, the Allied powers aimed to locate and remove all administrative 
structures and artistic items of Nazi origin. There was legitimate concern that ideologically 
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loaded, material things had the potential to stoke or revivify pro-Nazi sentiments, 
accentuate the pain of the current devastation, and even foster violence. At first, censorship 
and destruction were the presumed course of action. Having to confront these works in 
tandem with the precious works of art that the Nazis had looted from other countries 
intensified debates on the power and the innate value of images. Allied policies in the 
immediate postwar years, as this chapter will document, determined how the fraught 
artistic legacy of National Socialism would be evaluated and preserved in the following 
decades. Emphasis on historical and pedagogical—if not artistic—importance, ultimately 
guaranteed its survival.  
Ironically, the immediate fate of disparaged Nazi art was linked to the German and 
European cultural patrimony that was deemed invaluable. Even before the end of World 
War II, the Allies made a substantial effort to protect the monuments, artworks, and 
archives of historical and cultural significance located within combat zones. They 
established specific government organizations to recover looted items and secure and 
transport displaced and damaged art. The best known of the art protection agencies was the 
American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments 
in War Areas, also known as the Roberts Commission, established in 1943. 19 Directly 
responsible for informing military personnel of the locations of objects to be secured and 
saved, lest they be damaged or stolen, its purview included museum collections, 
monuments, historic buildings, and libraries. Composed of a number of scholars, art 
historians, collectors, and artists, the Roberts Commission compiled lists of artworks and 
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culturally significant monuments and buildings, distributing this information to Allied 
troops in order to help protect Europe’s heritage during combat.20 
Throughout the course of the war, the Allies established a variety of cultural 
protection organizations, many of which overlapped in their personnel and tasks. These 
included the Vaucher Committee (a multinational Allied art protection unit, founded in 
1944); the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (which served as the centralized Allied 
information agency on National Socialist art theft); and the Monuments, Fine Arts, and 
Archives (MFAA) division (composed of American, French, and British members).21 All 
of these military units gathered maps, files, lists, and photographs documenting 
monuments, collections, works of arts, and information on persons involved in German 
looted art.22 These organizations centralized their findings before the end of World War II 
at the Vaucher Committee’s London office, which existed until 1945. After 1945, the 
Vaucher Committee formally disbanded and the Western Allies used the information 
gathered by all of these organizations during the war to aid in their postwar restitution 
efforts. 
With the defeat of the Axis forces, the Allies concluded that they needed to 
formulate both a political and cultural plan for Germany’s future, as these two concerns 
were intertwined. The cultural front involved two opposing strategies of preservation and 
censorship. On the one hand, they needed to recuperate looted artworks, including those 
 
20 The Monuments Men Foundation, “American Council of Learned Societies,” 
Monuments Men Foundation website, accessed May 20, 2018. 
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/the-heroes/american-council-of-learned-
societies. 
21 For information on the Vaucher Committee, see 
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22 Lauterbach, Der Central Collecting Point in München, 22. 
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from Germany’s own esteemed historical past (even if the National Socialists had exploited 
that past for their own goals). On the other, they feared the continued propagation of Nazi 
ideology, including its bellicose and imperialist components that were so powerfully 
expressed in the regime’s own art.  
As David Freedberg argued in The Power of Images: Studies in the History and 
Theory of Response, the ability of paintings and sculptures to provoke a range of emotional 
reactions–from veneration to anger–derives from their association with a specific creator, 
regime, or location.23 Indeed they may be said to embody or emanate the aura of those 
people, spaces, and moments, and hence, collective memories. In postwar Germany certain 
monuments, spaces, and decorations were believed to function as still active agents of 
National Socialism; they represented a national spirit and ambition, as well as international 
calamity and the murder of tens of millions. By removing, altering, or destroying them, the 
military governments eradicated the lingering power of the Nazi regime, and did so with a 
violence both physical and symbolic. 
At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, the Allies agreed that Germany would 
be split into zones of occupation to ensure denazification and demilitarization. 24  The 
country was divided amongst the USA, USSR, France, and Britain, with each possessing 
equal power and the ability to form their respective military governments (figure 2).25 That 
same year these countries established the Allied Control Council in Berlin to coordinate 
their policies.26 The Control Council granted the occupiers equal authority and served as 
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the base of operations for the Allied occupation.27 The American version of the Control 
Council’s founding documents proclaimed: 
The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again 
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essentials steps in the 
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and 
militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals 
for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of 
Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s capacity to make war, 
and the preparation for the eventual reconstruction of German political life 
on a democratic basis.28 
The Control Council documents also laid out the scope of denazification, which was to 
dissolve “the Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised 
organizations, and all Nazi public institutions which were set up as instruments of Party 
domination,” and prohibit “their revival in any form.”29 Further to this effort, it read: “all 
archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted to the 
perpetuation of German militarism, will be taken under your [Allied] control, and their 
properties held pending decisions as to their disposition by the Control Council.” 30  The 
laws sanctioning the eventual destruction of these properties were officially enacted in 
1946. Already in June 1945, for example, the United States military government ordered 
all Nazi symbols and references to National Socialism removed from public spaces in their 
zone, including carved eagles and swastikas that adorned building facades and interiors.31  
Considering fine arts and mass-produced printed matter one and the same kind of 
heinous propaganda, the Allies agreed that they would need to rid Germany of these 
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dangerous items.32 The Central Collecting Points (CCP). created to collect, catalogue, and 
save valuable European artworks that had been looted and damaged soon served a double, 
and contrary, purpose. The artworks sent to them and temporarily housed for protection 
quickly expanded in numbers to include National Socialist material destined for 
destruction. 33  
The manner in which the Allies treated Nazi heritage during the postwar partition 
and occupation profoundly affected the German collective memory. While each of the 
allied, victorious powers engaged in iconoclasm—destroying buildings, monuments, 
artworks, and other items of Nazi origin—there came a point when the French, British, and 
Americans realized that some historical value resided in the confiscated Nazi fine arts and 
ephemera. The Soviet involvement in the preservation of Nazi fine art during the 
occupation is difficult to ascertain. While the Control Council documents, signed by the 
USSR, demonstrate that the Soviets agreed with the Western Allies on the censorship of 
Nazi fine art and ephemera, information about the fate of Nazi materials within the eastern 
zone is not readily available. Nonetheless, documents came to light after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain indicating that some items of National Socialist visual culture were censored but 
ultimately preserved by the Soviet government.34 
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Germany in Ruins: Repurposing an Unusable Past  
From May 1942 to the end of the war in May 1945, Allied military strategy focused on the 
bombing of cities in an effort to bring the Third Reich to its knees.35 Housing, roads, 
railroads, industrial sites, and cultural monuments were the targets of aerial attacks. 36 
British and American firebombing left small cities such as Jülich and Düren completely 
leveled, while major centers such as Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, Hamburg, and Hanover 
were largely reduced to mounds of debris. 37 Four hundred million cubic meters of rubble, 
including the remains of nearly three million of the sixteen million apartments that existed 
before the war, accumulated in West Germany alone. 38  An additional four million 
apartments were so extensively damaged they were deemed useless. 39  The Roberts 
Commission had provided maps of cultural centers to the British and American troops in 
an effort to protect as much cultural heritage as possible.40 Nevertheless, the bombing 
destroyed eighty  percent of historic buildings in the major cities, and the treasures and/ or 
bombastic Nazi décor within.41  
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Numerous case studies, such as Jeffry M. Diefendorf’s essay “The New City: 
German Urban Planning and the Zero Hour,” have been devoted to the extensive damage.42 
Diefendorf details the destruction of Cologne, which was on the receiving end of a 
thousand-bomber air raid on May 31, 1942, as well as the last great air raid of March 2, 
1945.43 The latter assault destroyed most of the buildings still standing in the inner parts of 
the city, save the cathedral, which was severely compromised.44 When on March 6, 1945, 
the Americans seized Cologne—a city that had remained under artillery fire for the 
previous four weeks—seventy percent of the city’s 250,000 dwellings had been destroyed 
or severely damaged, and twenty-four million cubic meters of rubble filled the ruined 
city.45 Those who lived through the war estimated that forty thousand people had died in 
Cologne during the air raids, but the real number was much less and closer to fifty-five 
hundred.46  
Given the lack of infrastructure and housing, architecture—salvaged, rebuilt, or 
new—became a focus of Allied resources. The preservation and immediate use or 
conversion of standing buildings became part of the discussion regarding the threat of Nazi 
visual culture to the reconstruction–physical and moral–of postwar Germany. While the 
fate of many buildings constructed during the Third Reich, such as the Nazi party 
administration buildings in Munich, was demolition, others ultimately served purposes 
important to the occupying powers. The military governments converted them into 
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administrative centers or, due to a lack of resources, utilized them within their existing 
functions. 
A key example was the Tempelhof Airport, which had been built in 1923, had 
undergone extensive renovations during the Third Reich, and had survived the war intact. 
Tempelhof became critical for the American occupation of Berlin because it was located 
close to the city and still functioned as an airport. In order to purge the site of associations 
with Nazi Germany, the American Military removed from the facade all traces of National 
Socialist relief elements, including a large stone eagle. 47  The intended effect was to 
“cleanse” the building of all associations with the regime and deter any revival of pro-Nazi 
sentiments. By removing the visual traces of Nazism, the foreign victors were making 
tangible the conditions of Germany’s unconditional surrender and visually reinforcing the 
Allied power over the Germans.48 
In The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch writes that when authoritarian regimes of the early twentieth 
century were finally defeated, the anger of the conquered population toward the victors 
quickly dissipated.49 The former enemy was no longer an adversary, but became, instead, 
a benevolent force in rebuilding, directing the collective consciousness toward the future 
with hope and confidence.50 On July 23, 1945, the American Military Government issued 
a directive requiring all streets, parks, institutions, and buildings named after Nazi objects 
or party members to be changed. By then, however, German anti-Nazi groups had already 
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begun to follow the spirit of that decree on a smaller scale, defacing Nazi insignias on 
memorials and monuments, and tearing down street signs.51 For example, in June 1945, 
citizens of Munich covered the east side of the Feldherrnhalle with graffiti and tore down 
various Nazi memorials throughout the city.52 
When the Americans had entered Munich—the birthplace of National Socialism—
on April 30, 1945, the city had been largely destroyed. A majority of the city’s cultural 
centers suffered severe damage, including the Alte and Neue Pinakothek museums 
(although their precious contents had been carefully stored and protected).53 Yet, the Haus 
der Deutschen Kunst (HDK), designed by one of Hitler’s favored architects, Paul Ludwig 
Troost, remained intact thanks to camouflage netting that had been put in place in 
September 1942 and successfully protected it from air raids.54 Because the building had 
cooking facilities and a relatively enormous amount of space, the American military 
converted it into barracks and an officers’ club.55  
Hitler commissioned the Haus der Deutschen Kunst, located on the southern edge 
of Munich’s Englischer Garten, with the intent to showcase contemporary paintings and 
sculpture that were commissioned and approved by the Nazi party as harbingers of a new 
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German Renaissance. Most infamously, the museum began in 1937 to host the annual 
Großen Deutsche Kunstausstellungen (Great German Art Exhibitions) (GDK), the most 
important exhibition and venue for the sale of German art during the Nazi period. This 
museum, with its Neoclassical style that asserted the Aryan lineage of the German people, 
was also home to numerous Nazi party celebrations and other National Socialist activities.  
In 1947 the Haus der Deutschen Kunst appeared on a list of historic museums slated 
for protection and preservation due to its historical and cultural significance. 56 United 
States military documents do not explain why the building appeared on this list. One reason 
might have been that the museum’s Nazi associations were deemed less important in 
comparison with the premium placed on usable buildings. The paucity of resources in the 
postwar period necessitated a blind eye when it came to re-purposing existing regime 
structures. It may also be surmised that because the Pinakothek museums had suffered 
severe damage, the Americans decided it was prudent to preserve the Haus der Deutschen 
Kunst and its function in their cultural rehabilitation program.57 For example, starting in 
1946 the Americans moved a number of old masterworks, formerly housed in the Alte 
Pinakothek, into the west wing of the Troost building, at which time the public began 
referring to the museum as the Haus der Kunst, removing the nationalistic Deutschen from 
its name.58 Other Nazi cultural centers were also preserved as part of the Allied postwar 
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cultural rehabilitation program. In 1948 the Führerbau became the America House—a 
still-extant cultural center dedicated to promoting democracy and strengthening German-
American relations. The Nazi Party Administration Building was converted into the 
Munich Central Collection Point. Other prominent Nazi buildings in Munich had survived, 
notably the entire Königsplatz or NSDAP district; but in this case, unlike the Haus der 
Kunst, the Americans demolished the two memorials to fallen party members, the 
Ehrentempel (Temples of Honor), there in 1947.59  
As in the Western zones, the Soviets also converted former Nazi buildings into 
administrative centers, for example, the former Reich Ministry of Aviation in Berlin. A 
highly symbolic edifice, the Reich Ministry was one of Hitler’s first building projects, 
begun in 1935 after Paul von Hindenburg appointed him chancellor.60 Hermann Göring 
directed the German Air Force from this site, which played a prominent role throughout 
World War II. Soon after Germany’s defeat, however, the building served an important 
administrative function for Soviet politics. In 1947 the German Economic Commission 
was founded at this location, operating as the central administrative organization for the 
Soviet occupation. In 1949 it became a ceremonial site for the signing of the documents 
which established the German Democratic Republic. By 1950 the Soviets had renamed the 
former Reich Ministry the House of Ministries, and the building housed the cabinet and 
chief executive body of the GDR until German reunification in 1989.61  
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The Allies and German Patrimony 
During the war German citizens and government officials aimed to protect their 
possessions and cultural heritage from looting and aerial bombardments. They moved 
many artworks to safer locations, generally underground. In the postwar period, British and 
American MFAA officers searched German and Austrian towns and cities for missing 
inventory, especially for objects that had been evacuated from Germany’s national 
museums and the occupied territories. MFAA officers interrogated Nazi officials and 
civilians in their efforts to locate the storage areas. No one could have imagined the 
astounding number of repositories uncovered, nor the conditions of the sites. For example, 
the Heilbronn mine hoard, located in Baden-Württemberg, contained 393 uncrated 
paintings and an additional nearly 4,000 artworks and objects.62 By 1947 the Allies were 
still discovering art repositories in Germany at a rate of thirty per month.63  
The American, French, and British militaries worked together to catalogue and 
restitute the artworks they uncovered to their rightful owners and countries of origins.64 
Nonetheless, these efforts were not always successful: many of the Jewish families whose 
 
62 Nicholas, The Rape of Europa, 336. Nicholas details: “The facilities there were not 
good. Three hundred and ninety-three uncrated paintings, 2,091 print boxes, 1,214 crates, 
and 140 bundles of textiles were jammed into nine dampish rooms.” 
63 United States National Archives, File Series 007, Box 129. Office of Military 
Government Economics Division. APO 741. 9 March 1947 Subject: Return to German 
Agencies of Cultural Materials. National Archives College Park, Maryland. 
64 There are documents detailing correspondences between the US military and Soviets 
pertaining to restitution, however, the Soviets were not always forthcoming see United 
States National Archives, File Series 007, Box 129. National Archives College Park, 
Maryland. Additionally, it was later revealed that the Soviets looted thousands of 
paintings, archives, and rare books during the occupation which had previously been 
looted by the Nazis. For further details see Sophia Kishkovsky’s, “A New Glasnost on 




art collections were pillaged by the Nazis had lost their lives in the Holocaust and war. 
Others were exiled and displaced. In order to administer, preserve, and record the recovered 
artworks, the British and American military governments formed the Central Collecting 
Points. The American military took the lead in determining the best regional locations for 
these centers, which were established in Baden-Württemburg, Frankfurt, Kassel, Marburg, 
Darmstadt, and Munich.65 The British meanwhile used a former castle located in the city 
of Celle to store over two hundred damaged works that had belonged to the Berlin National 
Gallery.66  
The largest of the Central Collection Points was located in the American zone, 
along the Königsplatz in Munich, in the former Nazi Party Administration Building and 
Führerbau.67 The American military appointed the American art historian Craig Hugh 
Smyth as the first director of the Munich CCP. There he employed art historians, librarians, 
and photographers from the United States and those from Germany who had cleared 
denazification questionnaires and did not have any extensive involvement with the Nazi 
party.68 Under Smyth’s guidance, Munich CCP staff implemented a property card system 
for documenting the objects in their possession and identifying potential owners. As soon 
as an object had been inventoried and the provenance confirmed, the MFAA began their 
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restitution efforts.69 Because there was such an extensive array of items in the care of the 
CCP, not all individual artworks and artifacts made it into inventories, and many items 
were subsequently looted by thieves, both civilian and military, from the centers.70  
Not all artworks and cultural items that entered the Munich CCP had been acquired 
as part of the restitution program, which restricted itself to artworks looted by the Nazis or 
seized from Jews under Aryanization laws. When the Americans took control of the Haus 
der Kunst, officers discovered thousands of artworks that had been shown at the annual 
Großen Deutsche Kunstausstellungen (Great German Art Exhibitions) (GDK) on the 
premises.71 These artworks included submissions from the final GDK in 1944, as well as 
unclaimed works from the other editions, which had started in 1937. Among the paintings 
and sculptures uncovered were those sold to the German Labor Front and other Nazi party 
organizations such as the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.72 The 
MFAA took control of these now tainted artworks and brought them to the Munich CCP, 
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The Debate over the Fate of Nazi Art 
Although the Allied Control Council agreed that all items of Nazi origin had to be removed 
from the public sphere, they had not considered what they would then do with them. Each 
of the military governments dealt with these undesirable spoils of war in a variety of ways: 
some of these material artefacts were removed from view, others destroyed. Different and 
immediate ad hoc responses resulted within each of the occupied zones. Perhaps the most 
complex and historically significant fracture that led to the preservation of the largest hoard 
of National Socialist visual culture was the one that occurred between the American 
Military and the Control Council. Unlike the French or British militaries, the United States’ 
War Department felt there was a void in the Control Council’s valuation of some 
confiscated Nazi properties and eventually placed historical significance on a number of 
their spoils.74 
In June 1945, United States Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson established the 
Historical Properties Division of the Army Headquarters of the United States Military.75 
The Historical Properties Division collected war-related items with the intent that these 
objects and artworks would eventually be displayed in the Pentagon as spoils of war.76 A 
memorandum established the division’s objectives: 
[The object of this division is] to provide for the collection, processing, 
preservation, and control of war paintings, photographs, maps, trophies, 
relics, and objects of actual or potential historic interest or value produced 
during the present war. . . It is contemplated that, pending decision as to the 
ultimate disposition of these properties, such items as may possess 
decorative or cultural values may be suitably displayed in The Pentagon and 
other War Department buildings in the Washington Metropolitan Area. 
Such material as may be approved for these purposes by the War 
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Department Bureau of Public Relations may be made available to publishers 
of books, magazines, and newspapers for reproduction…77 
The memorandum set a legal precedent for the potential preservation of Nazi art and visual 
culture on the grounds that war paintings were being collected for historical and 
educational purposes. As expressed in the directive’s proclamation, some materials would 
be exhibited in the Pentagon, and, furthermore, others could be approved for reproduction 
and circulation. On November 7, 1945 the War Department issued a memo to U.S. 
Commanding Generals stationed in Europe explaining what they meant by war paintings 
or objects of actual or potential historic interest, including mediums and subject matter: 
[We] Request you collect all available paintings, watercolors, engravings, 
and drawings showing troop activities, view of battle fields, military 
installations, industrial home front activities produced by German and 
Italian artist[s] during present war. Ship to Historical Property Section, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, Room 2 B 328 the 
Pentagon.78 
Despite what the Historical Properties Division of the U.S. Army set out to do, the Allied 
Control Council contradicted their orders six months later on May 13, 1946, when they 
issued Directive No. 30, which legalized the requisitioning of any Nazi-era item and the  
fate of these materials. 79  The Control Council declared that all symbols of German 
militarism and National Socialism had to be removed from public view by January 1, 
1947. 80  Furthermore, the directive established that “all publications and material 
mentioned in this order shall be placed at the disposal of the Military Zone Commanders 
for destruction.” 81  While the Control Council did not establish the exact means of 
 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid., 17. 
79 von Oppen, Documents on Germany under occupation, 134. 
80 NS-Dokumentationszentrum. Exhibition information. Investigating the Nazi Period, 
28-33. 2015. NS-Dokumentationszentrum archives, Munich, Germany. 
81 von Oppen, Documents on Germany under occupation, 135. 
 31 
destruction, it was subsequently left to German officials from across the Western zones to 
inventory artworks and monuments created under the Third Reich and formulate for their 
removal. They then presented these plans to the Allied authorities, who issued a time frame 
for their implementation and completion. In order to reinforce the directive, the Control 
Council established that if the local governments did not comply, their disobedience would 
constitute a crime, for which the Allies would decide the sanction.82  Thus, local city 
governments carried out the removal and destruction of National Socialist materials.83 
For example, on November 30, 1946, the director of Munich’s city art collection 
presented United States military government officials with a list of 117 sculptures (mainly 
bronze busts of Nazi officials), 105 paintings, and a tapestry (depicting a Reich eagle with 
a swastika and wreath), objects that had been removed from various sites across the city, 
such as the Lenbachhaus Gallery, city government offices, and school classrooms.84 As per 
the Control Council’s decree, the destiny of these materials fell into the hands of local 
government officials who were instructed by the officials from the United States military 
to destroy all items containing Nazi sentiments.85 Records detailing the total number of 
items purged within the zones and the manner through which artworks were destroyed are 
scarce, evincing both the large number of items confiscated and the low esteem in which 
this “art” was held by Allied officers and their German counterparts. 
Despite the iconoclasm in response to Directive no. 30 and the general consensus 
among the Allies that Nazi imagery lacked artistic merit, not all Nazi fine art fell under its 
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purview. For example, the MFAA staff at the Munich CCP largely ignored the Control 
Council’s directive and instead focused on the directives from the United States’ Historical 
Properties Division–which placed some value on visual culture. Although there were 
concerns about the incendiary propagandistic value of the imagery made under National 
Socialism, the officers stationed at the Munich CCP reviewed the Nazi artworks they 
collected and either kept some as part of the Historical Properties Division memo to collect 
war-related items, or in some cases offered to return works (probably those not representing 
scenes of war) to the makers. For example, a number of artworks from the Great German 
Art Exhibitions had been found in the HDK, and in some cases the MFAA staff contacted 
artists determined to have survived the war and offered to return the artworks to their 
makers—provided the artwork was free of any explicit Nazi propaganda and that the 
individual had passed a denazification questionnaire (a 131 question survey used by the 
Allies to determine an individual’s level of involvement in National Socialism).86 This act 
suggests that certain military personnel perceived a kind of inherent value in the works 
and, at a minimum, in the craft and labor of an individual’s hand. Significantly many of 
these artists demurred when offered back their works: they had neither the money nor the 
desire to pay the shipping costs.87 In most cases they asked the MFAA officers to destroy 
their objects, likely a means of concretely and symbolically disavowing their personal past 
and connection to a tainted epoch in national history.88 Others perhaps did so out of fear. 
With few takers, means of exposition, or institutional storage, this body of art remained 
stranded, notwithstanding its increasing aura of taboo. Thus, many of these items remained 
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hidden at the Central Collection Points until their fate could be determined (as will be 
discussed). 
In May 1946—as German government officials were rounding up National 
Socialist visual propaganda and MFAA officer working at the Munich CCP were 
contacting artists regarding the return of their art from the HDK—the Historical Properties 
Division of the United States Military assigned Captain Gordon W. Gilkey as chief of the 
newly established German Wartime Art Program.89 The German Wartime Art Program 
was established as a part of and in response to the aforementioned Historical Properties 
Division objective to collect, process, preserve, and control war paintings, photographs, 
maps, trophies, relics, and objects of actual or potential historical interest.90 Due to the 
various orders from the U.S. Military branches and Control Council, coupled with the 
number of tasks asked of the officers, the Historical Properties division found that no 
substantial German war art had entered into their care. Thus, they felt the need to establish 
a specific German War Art Program in order to ensure they achieved their objective. 
Colonel Clanton W. Williams, Chief Historian, Air Force and Major Hermann W. 
Williams, Jr. (a former curator of paintings at The Metropolitan Museum of Art and 
Director of the Corcoran Gallery in Washington D.C.) both referred Captain Gordon W. 
Gilkey for the job due to his military service and background as an art teacher and artist 
(figure 3).91 
 By the end of 1946, after seven months of investigation, Captain Gilkey had 
identified approximately 10,000 paintings and sculptures of bellicose, militaristic, or 
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propagandistic content, mostly located in South German art depots and at the Munich 
CCP.92 The list enumerated the remaining artworks recovered from the HDK, Bad Aussee 
in Austria, and former NSDAP buildings, including artworks from the basement of the 
Führerbau in Munich, private collections of Nazi officials such as Göring and Hitler, and 
the traveling SS war art show organized by Heinrich Himmler.93 While the subject of many 
of the paintings and watercolors were Hitler and other prominent military figures, others 
included depictions of young soldiers and youthful women carrying Nazi banners—just a 
few of the most obsequious nationalistic typologies encouraged by the Third Reich. 94 At 
this time, no documents exist that record whether the American military was aware of the 
racist content behind the depiction of blond-haired, fair-skinned Germans. Such 
sophisticated, if obvious, analysis would take decades to undertake.  
After he completed his investigation, Gilkey organized an exhibition of German 
war art demonstrating the work he had done on behalf of the Historical Properties 
Division’s German War Art Program (figure 4). He had confiscated 8,722 works of art, but 
only a fraction of them were selected for the exhibition.95 Gilkey outlined his reasoning in 
his journal, stating: 
I selected 103 war pictures and placed them in the Frankfurt a/Main Staedel 
Museum for an exhibition of German war art. On 6 December 1946, at 1100 
hours, General Joseph T. McNarney, Commanding General, United States 
Forces, European Theater, and Colonel Harold E. Potter, Chief, Historical 
Division, Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater, prevued 
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[previewed] the exhibition. During the afternoon of the same day, press 
representatives and photographers from the major syndicates in the United 
States were escorted through the exhibit. From 7 December 1946 through 
15 December 1946, the museum was open to American and Allied 
personnel. Fifteen hundred people accepted the promise of no heat or lights, 
during the cold weather at that time, to see the exhibit, which was placed in 
the three remaining rooms with four walls in the bombed building.96 
Captain Gilkey further noted that many of the works were created during the war by 
German officers who drew and painted scenes of war and combat during their downtime 
at the front. Army commanders then sent these works to various Nazi organizations for 
display and potential review by the Führer.97 Throughout his inquiry Gilkey recorded his 
findings on the extensive program of war art inside the Third Reich, only occasionally 
reviewing the techniques and subject matter of the works he collected. According to 
Gilkey’s journal, combat artists were required to record foreign locations and people and 
lacked any sense of creative freedom–most likely because of the totalitarian Nazi cultural 
policies.98 Within his writings, Gilkey does discuss his conversations with German war 
artists, giving occasional quotes. For example, Gilkey interviewed, artist Luitpold Adam, 
a prominent member of the Frontkämpferbundes bilder Künstler (Front Fighters 
Association of Fine Artists), who had been appointed head of the Gruppe Maler-und 
Pressezeichner in der Propaganda-Ersatzabteilung (Painter Group and Press Signs in the 
Propaganda Replacement Department) in Potsdam in 1941. In the interview, Adam stated 
that he and another artist believed that war art conveyed the “war’s episodical and lyric 
moments.”99 Gilkey did not comment on his opinions of this sentiment and simply recorded 
it as an anecdote relating to the history of these artworks. Towards the end of his journal 
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Gilkey assessed how the artworks embodied the totalitarian belief system of Nazi culture, 
noting: 
Perhaps combat artists were sincere, working artists are simple people. But 
behind it always was Adolf Hitler and the men around him…Hitler 
advocated freedom in art, but freedom only within the small scope of what 
he personally approved (and what the majority of the Germans understood) 
– monumental realism. All else was “degenerate and verboten.”…A 
blindfold was placed on the borders of Germany to keep German people 
free from contamination and influence of contemporary culture and 
progressive creative movements on other lands. A good beginning of 
German Expressionism in art was declared degenerate and verboten. A 
generation of German was brought up in cultural ignorance. A generation 
of Germans assumed responsibility for the destruction of the best of all their 
precursors… German art became a tool to spread the manure of Nazism and 
Nazi directed German Militarism.100 
 
In sum, Gilkey believed that National Socialism, with its ardent nationalism, could only 
produce artworks made in the style of a bombastic realism and lacked a sense of artistic 
creativity–associated with individual autonomy.  
Captain Gilkey’s project and subsequent museum show prompted discussions 
among military officials and cultural historians on the power and judgment of Nazi visual 
culture and led to a reconsideration of its fate. Indeed, after the close of the German War 
Art exhibition in September 1947, the director of the Munich CCP, Herbert S. Leonard, 
found himself staunchly resisting the Control Council’s policy of destruction, apparently 
informed by discussions with others: “It is the feeling among those historians here that 
these materials should not be exhibited or seen, but further that it should not be considered 
as the act of vandalism [to] deprive future generations of making a full and just estimate of 
the Nazi character, spirits, and times.”101 While military personnel and historians did not 
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(openly) argue for any inherent aesthetic quality of this art, they did consider it, for better 
or worse, historical material culture and hence, patrimony—an educational tool, if nothing 
else. Furthermore, they acknowledged the role of temporal and geographical distance in 
potential reevaluation. Gilkey’s pedagogical approach, and the opinion forwarded by 
Leonard, resulted in the preservation of Nazi painting and sculpture that encompassed more 
than what the Historical Properties Division had set out to collect. Leonard’s inability to 
follow the policies set forth by the United States Government eventually led to his 
dismissal as head of the Munich CCP in 1949.102 Gilkey and Leonard nonetheless managed 
to preserve all 8,772 Nazi artworks, orchestrating their transportation to the United States 
in 1947. Once in the United States, a majority of those items with incendiary subject matter 
remained censored in the collection storage facilities at the United States Army Center for 
Military History in Washington, DC; nonetheless a selection of military scenes were 
eventually displayed inside the Pentagon until the 1980s.103 
 
Continued Censorship of Nazi Fine Art and German Steps toward Atonement 
Although the objects collected by the U.S. Military did not enter into the public purview in 
the United States, some former MFAA Officers and soldiers returned to America and 
openly discussed the Nazi artworks they saw during their time in Germany. For example, 
in 1945, the American writer Lincoln Kirstein penned the article "Art in the Third Reich –
Survey, 1945," published in the Magazine of Art in October 1945.104 Unlike Gilkey, whose 
 
102 Lauterbach, Der Central Collecting Point in München, 64. 
103 Ibid., 164. The subject of the removal of these artworks from the Pentagon and other 
government offices is the subject of chapter three. 
104 Lincoln Kirstein, “Art in the Third Reich – Survey 1945.” Magazine of Art, October 
1945, 223-40. 
 38 
journal served to document what he uncovered and how to report it to his commanding 
officers, Kirstein's article, written for a larger audience, underscored how elements of Nazi 
art reflected the atrocities committed by the Third Reich.  
To begin with, when discussing the history of the Great German Art Exhibitions, 
Kirstein argued that the visual narratives depicted in Nazi painting represented an idealized 
world that deliberately avoided the harsh realities of their actual time and place.  Indeed, 
he noted how the style of Nazi painting and sculpture was deliberately out of time, a throw-
back to the neo-classicism or realist naturalism of the nineteenth century.  Moreover, the 
imagery of the artworks, he wrote, was “beauty-parlor mask for murder.” 105 This statement 
could be inferred as a veiled reference to the concentration camps, with National Socialist 
paintings serving as propaganda to support the grotesque extermination of the Jews, Roma, 
and other “degenerate” people who did not adhere to the pseudo-criteria defining the Aryan 
race. Kirstein analyzed stylistic elements of stereotypical Nazi sculpture including the 
frozen, overly masculine–almost pornographic (or homoerotic)–nudes of Josef Thorak and 
Arno Breker.106 His discussion of the of the Nazi representations of the ideal, human body 
alluded to the regime’s eugenics programs. Kirstein’s analysis exemplifies how, in the 
immediate postwar period, those familiar with the atrocities of the Third Reich saw them 
directly expressed within the art dictated under its auspices. 107  Kirstein, like Gilkey, 
believed that Nazi fine art was devoid of any imagination or ingenuity–a result of what he 
believed was a restricted and insidious program of cultural propaganda.  
 Kirstein and Gilkey’s assertion that the Nazi totalitarian cultural system led to 
uninspired and oppressed art was not unique to them; it was a belief largely held by the 
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Western Allies. After the war, the victors believed that they needed to reshape the German 
cultural sphere, and thus introduced exhibition programs to educate the German people on 
international art movements. The approach to cultural reeducation was vastly different in 
the Soviet zone, and the divide became even more pronounced in 1949 with Germany’s 
split into the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the democratic Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG). East German artists now worked under the style and content 
dictates of Socialist Realism (which ironically shared quite a few stylistic features with 
National Socialist art), reinforced by official exhibitions of the same. In contrast, West 
Germany, influenced by the U.S.A, France, and Britain promoted the historical avant-garde 
denigrated by the Nazis, ignoring figurative art in general lest it be associated with 
didacticism. The emphasis on modernist art from other Allied nations also addressed fifteen 
years of Nazi censorship and parochialism. Modernism was seen to value individual 
feelings, tastes, and opinions, and hence, respect for the feelings, tastes, and opinions of 
others.108  
By focusing on the international avant-garde, the West German art establishment 
aimed to set the historical record straight on the importance of modernism, and why and 
how the Nazis abused it for propaganda purposes. The Haus der Deutschen Kunst, which 
had been officially converted back into a museum, kept the 1946 moniker the Haus der 
Kunst and began showing avant-garde and contemporary works. One of the first milestones 
of German atonement for the Nazi vilification of the avant-garde was the September 1949 
exhibition Der Blaue Reiter (The Blue Rider). Artists featured in the show included 
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Wassily Kandinsky, Franz Marc, and Paul Klee, all of whom had been included in the Nazi 
Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition of 1937.109 During the exhibition’s opening 
Secretary of State Dieter Sattler remarked that the museum’s act of displaying “degenerate” 
artists inside the former HDK was a way to cleanse the space of its Nazi past.110  
West Germany’s steps towards atonement–and catching up with the history of 
modernism–were accompanied by the suppression of state sanctioned art produced during 
the Third Reich. In 1950, the United States returned 1,659 National Socialist artworks to 
the FRG.111 These particular works, assembled by Gilkey  under the German Wartime Art 
Program of the Historical Properties Division, were deemed by the Americans to be 
politically and militaristically neutral, posing no threat to the resurgence of German 
militarism or National Socialism. They likely depicted pastoral landscapes or battle scenes 
without prominent Nazi imagery.112 The art historian Bess Hormats, acting curator of the 
United States Army’s art collection in 1950, wrote that the West German government 
“didn’t want to have anything to do with the Nazi programs of World War II.”113 Thus, 
once the United States repatriated the works in the 1950s, they were directed into oblivion, 
left to molder in a Bonn warehouse until the 1970s.114  
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Chapter Two: The Generational Shift (1960-1979) 
  
In the decade and a half following the Allied program for the denazification of culture, 
German officials continued to censor art and ephemera produced by the regime. 
Consequently, few people dared study or discuss Nazi approved art from the period 1933 
to 1945.115 Art historians avoided the subject in much the same way that Germans of all 
professions distanced themselves from any association with the Third Reich. This attitude 
was understandable on the institutional level, given that many former Nazi museum 
directors, academics, and art dealers resumed their former positions and activities in the 
1950s, after passing the Allied denazification process.116 A number of artists, in addition 
to the infamous cases of Arno Breker and Leni Riefenstahl, were banned by the Allies from 
exhibiting their work publicly in Germany (this status changed in the 1980s, as will be 
discussed further in the next chapter).117 It was not until former Nazi museum directors and 
academics began retiring and a new wave of young Germans came of age in the late 1960s 
that there was a shift in the attitude towards the study of this taboo material. This chapter 
will address the circumstances that led to a generational shift in the 1960s and which 
resulted in a milestone event, in 1974: the first major West German museum exhibition to 
survey the art of the Third Reich. 
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Confronting the Past  
The FRG first began accounting for its Nazi past in the 1960s, after a decade of historical 
amnesia, when a younger generation came to understand the culpability of their parents’ 
and grandparents’ generations. It was accelerated by the 1961 Eichmann trial and then by 
the 1968 student movements. 118  By the 1970s the notion of the Nazi perpetrator and 
individual culpability entered into discussions of the history of the Third Reich.  
Addressing Nazism and the complicity of German citizens became, and remained, difficult 
in the postwar period, with denial compounded by the painful division of East and West, 
and the fact that many former Nazis were integrated into West German society with a 
number holding public office. The process of developing–and engraining–collective 
memory continued over decades: for example, the term “Holocaust” entered into West 
German vocabulary only in 1979 after the televised viewing of the eponymous American 
series.119 
West Germany’s reckoning with the past contrasted with the aggressive refusal for 
any accountability on the part of the Soviet satellite German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
The GDR, under the conceit of its communist ideology, presented itself as a liberating force 
against the evil of fascism. From the 1950s and beyond, the division of East and West 
Germany grew more pronounced, resulting in a deep cultural divide. After the initial 
building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, little remained physically or ideologically 
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to connect them. Initially, the GDR experienced new economic, educational, and social 
opportunities after the implementation of the “New Economic System” in 1963.120 In the 
realm of culture, the government exerted strict ideological control, a policy stemming from 
the offices of Walter Ulbrich, Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party beginning in the 1950s: 
The GDR demanded that all historical research, writing, and teaching represent the 
interests of the Communist Party and the working class. 121  According to Communist 
doctrine, Nazi-Fascism was an extension of capitalism. Thus, responsibility for the crimes 
of the Third Reich lay squarely upon the Federal Republic of Germany. 122  The East 
Germans rewrote the history of their older Germans citizens, claiming that, as Communists, 
they had led the resistance against the regime. Historians in the GDR did not confront their 
Nazi past because they did not consider it to be part of their heritage. As the historian 
Jeffrey Herf explains: 
The meaning of coming to terms with the Nazi past was simple and 
straightforward: smash capitalism. The Communists had always claimed 
that capitalism contained the roots of Nazism. Because these roots had been 
ripped up in the Soviet zone of occupation but were being replanted in the 
Western zones, the possibility of a renewed fascism now lay outside, and 
only outside East German borders, in West Germany. Antifascism was now 
directed against the West German present. It no longer refers exclusively or 
even primarily to the Nazi past.123 
 
Whereas the suppressed GDR had no internal permission, means, or impetus to examine 
collective or individual culpability, the conservative government of the FRG was 
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frequently criticized by its more liberal citizens for its unwillingness to confront the Nazi 
past. It became paramount to contextualize the Nazi era and relate it to the current political 
moment.124  While the position of GDR would also have been a target of these liberal 
critics, they were first and foremost concerned with fomenting change within their own 
government, in which a number of former Nazis held posts.125 
A critical turning point for the FRG was the aforementioned, highly-publicized 
1961 trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. The jury found Eichmann 
guilty of numerous charges, including organizing the deportation of Jews and Roma from 
Germany, Poland, and the surrounding territories. The testimonies, evidence, and 
proceedings sparked international interest in–and outrage over–the atrocities of the regime.  
Voices from within Germany and across the world began to decry the role of the perpetrator 
in Germany’s Nazi past, essentially shattering the amnesia that had taken over much of 
West German society. 
The growth in public awareness and debate regarding the role of everyday Germans 
and Nazi officials in crimes against humanity and the Third Reich’s demise intensified in 
1966 when Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief architect and Director of Armaments, was released 
from Spandau prison. Speer appeared in numerous television interviews and published two 
books: the 1969 Erinnerungen (Memories, or Inside the Third Reich) and the 1975 volume 
Spandauer Tagebücher (Spandau: The Secret Diaries). The attention paid to Hitler‘s 
favorite architect laid bare a new phenomenon that swept the nation in the late 1960s and 
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1970s: the fascination with high-profile Nazi figures and a growing sense of nostalgia for 
the Third Reich among certain quarters of the population.  
The increased nostalgia seen across citizens of all ages became known as the 
Hitlerwelle (Hitler-wave), a term coined in the 1970s.126 The Hitlerwelle brought about an 
increase of publications, films, and documentaries that reproduced images created in 
Germany from 1933 to 1945.127 Auctions selling Hitler memorabilia, as well as the highly 
publicized republication of the Nazi journal Signal in 1978, contributed to public access to 
Nazi imagery and growing desire to understand the recent past.128 In turn, art historians 
and scholars became concerned that, without contextualization, the public would fail to 
discern the still powerful draw of National Socialist imagery. Thus, during the peak of the 
Hitlerwelle, in the early 1970s a number of art historians began to excavate the art and 
cultural policies of Hitler’s Germany. In part, these art historians were invigorated by the 
student movements of 1968 that did much to protest against the unacceptable continuity 
between the Nazi past and the older generation still in positions of power.129  
Until the early 1970s, West German museum exhibitions dealt with the Nazi past 
by memorializing the repressive cultural polices of the Third Reich, specifically the 
“degenerate” art campaign against modernism and the avant-garde art and artists 
victimized by the regime. This approach made clear just how much German cultural 
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patrimony had been lost by the Nazi purging of museums and destruction and sale of 
artworks. The first effort in this regard was the 1962 exhibition Entartete Kunst: 
Bildersturm vor 25 Jahren (Degenerate Art: Iconoclasm 25 Years Ago), with a catalogue 
written by Jürgen Claus (b. 1935).130 Notable was the use of the term–and hence, the 
judgement against–iconoclasm. The show occurred in the wake of the 1961 Eichmann trial, 
adding to a sense of justice being served. 131  Staged to coincide with the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the 1937 Entartete Kunst exhibition, it was the first museum exhibition 
anywhere to address that nefarious show, and served to educate the public about the Nazi 
confiscation of artworks, the persecution of artists, and the loss to Germany of an enormous 
cultural patrimony–since many of the works had to be recuperated from foreign collections. 
The original “Degenerate Art” exhibition took place in the old Institute of Archeology in 
the Hofgarten, while the Nazi’s concurrently ran the first Große Deutsche Kunstausstellung 
across the park in the newly built HDK. The 1962 commemorative exhibition was held in 
the latter, in a powerful reversal and rectification. It was also a highly symbolic means to 
rehabilitate Troost’s building–to fill it with art that the regime attempted to eliminate. The 
use of the space as the center for the Allied recuperation of lost and looted works had 
already begun the process of “denazification,” but the staging of Degenerate Art: 
Iconoclasm 25 Years Ago demonstrated that contemporary Germany was itself addressing 
the cultural legacy of the Third Reich.   
It took another decade, however, for art shown at the yearly Große Deutsche 
Kunstausstellungen to be brought before the public. Within the museum and academy, new 
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attitudes and approaches towards Nazi fine art resulted partly from changes in an outdated 
and conservative system, namely the university and historical professions.132 As former 
Nazis retired, a new generation of curators and critics born in the 1930s and 1940s took 
their place, more interested in the sins of their parents than in denying deeds for which they 
were not directly responsible. Addressing the persecuted artists and artworks allowed for a 
pragmatic documentation of the cultural policies of the Third Reich, while encouraging a 
new transparency toward the visual propaganda it generated. Thus, Nazi art and artefacts 
came to be studied as historical facts, if not bona fide art.  
 
Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung  
It was not until the 1974 exhibition Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung 
(Art in the Third Reich: Documents of Subjugation) that the painting and sculpture 
produced during the Nazi period was displayed in a museum. The event sparked 
widespread reaction and discussion on the fate and value of National Socialist visual 
culture. This exhibition opened at the Frankfurt Kunstverein on October 15, 1974.  A joint 
project, it was co-organized by the Frankfurt Kunstverein and the Institute for Art History 
at the University of Frankfurt. 133  The exhibition curators and catalogue contributors 
included students from the University of Frankfurt, as well as Georg Bussmann (b. 1933), 
director of the Frankfurt Kunstverein; Berthold Hinz (b. 1941), assistant professor at the 
Institute for Art History, University of Frankfurt; and the academic and political scientist 
Iring Festscher (1922-2014). 134  Hundreds of documents, ranging from paintings and 
 
132 Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 8. 
133 Georg Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung. Frankfurt 
Am Main: Zweitausendeins, 1980, 3. 
134 Ibid. 
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photographs to maquettes and newspaper clippings, were exhibited alongside 40 paintings 
and a handful of small-scale sculptures, primarily busts.135 The curatorial staff procured a 
number of artworks that had not left government vaults since the 1940s, including works 
returned to the FRG from the United States in the 1950s.136 The examples included Ivo 
Saliger’s The Judgment of Paris (figure 5) and Julius Paul Junghans’s Ploughing (figure 
6) both formerly owned by Hitler—bringing to the fore the fact that the West German state 
was in possession of Nazi art.137  
As the subtitle of the exhibition “Documents of Subjugation” attests, the contents 
were weighted between fine art and archival items (the latter comprised the bulk of the 
installation) to impart the overall didactic intent: to show that National Socialism used the 
arts as a tool of totalitarianism, to control and inculcate the German population. In his lead 
text for the catalog George Bussmann explained:  
The exhibition is a narrative: in accompanying texts and photos, with the 
help of additional information and interpretation, as well as quotations from 
the social-political reality, the task and function of art under National 
Socialism is made clear: to make ideology "real" and effective. The 
exhibition can therefore not be viewed as a pure art exhibition, but rather as 
a documentation that shows the extent to which art served politics. The time 
of the exhibition coincides with a conspicuous and by no means harmless 
wave of reminiscences of the "Third Reich."  The field of fine arts is 
particularly in danger of being misunderstood – because it is supposedly to 
a lesser extent politically discredited. However, this cannot be countered by 
 
135 Der Spiegel, “Kunst - Ende Der Berührungsangst.” Der Spiegel, August 12, 1974, 86-
88. Accessed July 10, 2018. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41667270.html and 
Bussmann. Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 1. 
136 Ibid., 223 and Heskett, “Art and Design in Nazi Germany,” 140.  
137 Ibid., 139 and Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung. 187 
and Die Großen Deutsche Kunstausstellungen 1937 – 1944/45,” Badende Frauen” The 
Great German Art Exhibitions 1937 - 1944/45. Accessed November 17, 2018. 
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further tabooing the art of National Socialism and leaving it out of art 
history as "unartistic".138 
 
Among the key points, Bussmann framed the show as a didactic enterprise, not a show of 
“pure art” but art as nefarious, if effective, propaganda.  To be sure, in the postwar decades 
when most forms of naturalist-realism were considered suspect or retrograde and when 
abstract art served as the Cold War lingua franca of the “free” world, official Nazi art could 
only be judged as mendacious and lacking any aesthetic value.139 As the first exhibition to 
address this volatile imagery, and only at two decades removed from the fall of the Reich, 
the organizers had to preclude any accusations of encouraging neo-Nazi sentiments. The 
agenda was openly anti-Fascist, as made clear by Bussmann’s emphasis that its timing 
coincided “with a conspicuous and by no means harmless wave of reminiscences of the 
‘Third Reich’.”  
 
138 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 3. This is the 
author’s translation of the introduction. The original German is as follows: Die 
Ausstellung ist kommentiert: in begleitenden Texten und Fotos wird mit Hilfe zusätzlicher 
Information und Interpretation sowie mit Zitaten der politisch-sozialen Realität Aufgabe 
und Funktion der Kunst im Nationalsozialismus deutlich gemacht: Ideologie sinnlich 
anschaulich, damit "wirklich" und wirksam zu machen. Die Ausstellung kann daher auch 
nicht als reine Kunstaustellung angesehen werden, sondern eher als eine Dokumentation, 
die zeigt, in welchem Masse die Kunst welcher Politik diente. Der Zeitpunkt der 
Ausstellung fällt zusammen mit einer auffälligen und keineswegs harmlosen Welle von 
Ruckerinnerung an das "Dritte Reich". Der Bereich der bildenden Kunst - weil 
vermeintlich politisch nicht oder weniger diskreditiert - ist dabei ganz besonders in der 
Gefahr, missverstanden zu werden. Dem kann jedoch nicht dadurch begegnet werden, 
dass die Kunst des Nationalsozialismus weiter tabuisiert und als "unkunstlerich" aus der 
Kunstgeschichte ausgespart bleibt. 
139 For an article on the subject of fascist art as kitsch see Clement Greenberg, "The 
Avant-Garde and Kitsch by Clement Greenberg 1939." In Kitsch: The World of Bad 
Taste, by Gillo Dorfles, John McHale, Hermann Broch, and Clement Greenberg, 116-27. 
Bell: New York, 1969. 
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Given the aim of elucidating how Nazi art functioned as propaganda, the organizers 
carefully selected and installed the items on display .140 Bussmann outlined this fact in the 
opening of the catalogue where he wrote: “In the first comprehensive exhibition since 
1945, which deals with the art production of the Third Reich, the selection and preparation 
of materials from this not yet ‘overcome’ epoch must be taken with particular 
responsibility.”141 They feared triggering what Berthold Hinz called “carefree amusement 
or enthusiasm.”142 Nevertheless, neither Bussmann nor Hinz felt that the show risked being 
perceived as promoting National Socialist ideologies, even if it inevitably opened old 
wounds, caused anguish and shame, or prompted nostalgia–for some.143 While there would 
always be a danger in the power of Nazi images, they nonetheless felt the ethical need to 
address why this was the case. 
An article in Der Spiegel (composed of interviews and the author’s own summaries) 
published that August, only a few months before the opening, entitled “NS-Kunst—Ende 
der berührungsangst” (Nazi Art—The End of the Fear of Contact), gave a platform for the 
show’s aims:  
 
140 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 3. See also, 
George Bussman and Heinz Schütz’s, “Transformation Und Wiederkehr” published in 
Kunstforum International, 1988, 101-102. In this article Bussman discusses how he 
desired to stage this exhibition to counter his perceived sense of nostalgia for the Nazi 
period. In particular he emphasized that his fears were later confirmed by Pete Ludwig’s 
support of Arno Breker’s work, and the aesthetic value many people saw in the art 
produced during the Nazi period. 
141 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 1. This is the 
author’s translation of the introduction. The original German is as follows: “In der ersten 
umfassenden Ausstellung, die sich nach 1945 mit der Kunstproduktion des “Dritten 
Reiches” befasst, muss Auswahl und Aufbereitung des Materials aus dieser durchaus 
noch nicht “bewältigten” Epoche mit besonderer Verantwortlichkeit vorgenommen 
werden.” 
142 Der Spiegel, “Kunst - Ende Der Berührungsangst” and Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten 
Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 1. 
143 Ibid. 
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Bussmann believes it is urgent [for] his exhibition to didactically drive out 
the “art-only viewpoint” from his visitors, and Hinz asserts right away that 
he is not pursuing “the goal of opening up a new province for art history, 
which it has excluded to this day.” Rather, both aim to present art in [the 
context of its] political and social conditions and functions, an approach that 
as has recently gained considerable momentum…144   
Significantly, Der Spiegel, the most widely read magazine in the FRG, was chosen for 
advance publicity–and preparedness. The article noted that other scholarly disciplines were 
analyzing the Nazi period. Art history was behind in its study of the subjects, style, and 
iconography of the regime’s art, yet the issue of artistic quality was not to be broached: as 
Hinz affirmed, the only lines of inquiry were to determine the political and social 
conditions whence it derived.145  
 
Curatorial Presentation 
The exhibition was organized around three sections (inclusive of four different mediums): 
Architektur und Plastik im deutschen Faschismus (Architecture and Sculpture in German 
Fascism), Malerei des deutschen Faschismus (Painting of German Fascism), and Plakate 
des deutschen Faschismus (Posters of German Fascism). These sections were divided into 
additional ten subthemes, with headings that, for the most part, directed audiences toward 
 
144 Der Spiegel, “Kunst - Ende Der Berührungsangst.” This is the author’s translation of 
the introduction. The original German is as follows: “Bussmann hält es für vordringlich, 
seinen Ausstellungsbesuchern den "Nur-Kunst-Gesichtspunkt" didaktisch auszutreiben, 
und Hinz beteuert gleich einleitend, er verfolge nicht "das Ziel, der Kunstgeschichte eine 
neue, von ihr bis heute ausgegrenzte Provinz zu erschließen". Beider Ziel ist vielmehr, 
Kunst in politisch-gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen und Funktionen darzustellen, wie das 
(anhand anderer Sujets) letzthin beträchtlich in Schwung gekommen ist.” 
145 Ibid.  
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the Nazis’ propaganda and ideological goals, content that was reiterated in the respective 
catalogue texts.146 
Architektur und Plastik im deutschen Faschismus comprised the following 
categories: “Großbauten des Staates und der Partei: München, Nürnberg, Berlin” 
(Monumental Buildings of the State and the Party: Munich, Nuremberg, and Berlin); 
“Autobahnen” (Autobahn); “Das Bauprogramm der Deutschen Arbeitsfront–die Umwelt 
der Arbeiter” (The Building Program of the German Labor Front–the workers' 
environment); “Das Denkmal und sein Prinzip” (The Monument and its Principle); and 
“Plastik” (Sculpture). The second main section, Malerei des deutschen Faschismus was 
divided into four subsections that dealt with subject matter:  “Programmatische Malerei” 
(Programmatic Painting), “Die Darstellung des Bauern” (The Representation of the 
Farmer), “Darstellung der Arbeit Malerei und Plastik” (The Representation of Labor in 
Painting and Sculpture), “Die Darstellung der Frau” (Representation of Women) and “Die 
Darstellung des Krieges” (The Representation of War). Significantly, the third body of 
work–posters–was presented as a single whole.  
The committee wanted to end the “taboo” against Nazi imagery and attempted to 
do so by treating the artworks as instruments of heinous ideology and bad faith. They 
integrated certain paintings and sculpture executed for the annual Great German Art shows 
into thematic installations filled with illustrative tables, comments, texts, statistics, and 
photographs that demonstrated the wrongdoings of National Socialism. The titles of the 
exhibition should well have been reversed, for “Art in the Third Reich” was 
deterministically subsumed into “Documents of Subjugation.” Yet the lead term “art” 
 
146 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung. 1. 
 53 
undoubtedly served to pique the public interest and reflected the reality that, in the context 
of an exhibition, not a library, pictures are more interesting to look at and involve a different 
teaching experience than viewing a succession of documents.  
Upon entering the exhibition, visitors were confronted with a 1939 quote by the 
Frankfurt School theorist and former German refugee Max Horkheimer: “Who speaks of 
Fascism, may not be silent about Capitalism,” displayed in large font along the entrance 
hall.147 The words of Horkeimer, who had returned to teach at the University of Frankfurt 
(and who had died the year before the show opened) could perhaps have caused confusion 
to visitors familiar with the GDR’s doctrine that Fascism was the child of capitalism. 
(Fascism, not Nazism was the word of choice, to conjoin the German phenomenon to a 
larger, international one.) It could easily have made more conservative visitors uneasy; 
others would have understood the quote as framing the exhibition’s methodology according 
to the critical theory–anti-capitalism and liberal-Marxism–of the Frankfurt’s School’s 
Institute for Social Research. Horkeimer’s philosophy explored the political, economic, 
and societal conditions that led to the rise of totalitarianism in all forms. The exhibition 
organizers similarly aimed to document how Nazism utilized art to bind the public to 
National Socialist political, economic, and societal beliefs; the quote linking Fascism and 
Capitalism also served to protect them from charges of neo-Nazi sentiments from the Left.  
Indeed, the subsections on the Third Reich and architecture shared a unified theme 
about the exploited worker and the labor involved in the regime’s monumental building 
projects, including the successful autobahn.148 Photographs of major edifices, including the 
 
147 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 223, and Heskett, 
“Art and Design in Nazi Germany,” 140. 
148 Ibid., 46-120. 
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HDK and other Nazi party buildings on the Munich’s Königsplatz, were hung throughout 
the space and paired with newspaper articles and charts detailing their construction and 
size. 149 nAdditionally, the curators included maquettes of structures, such as the 
Mikronwerk in Aschaffenburg and Runder Platz in Berlin (figure 7), in order to emphasize 
the outsized scale of these commissions and promote a holistic look at totalitarian urban 
planning inside the Third Reich. 150  By connecting celebratory structures such as the 
Nuremberg Zeppelin Field, to the vast infrastructure project of the autobahn to lesser–
known projects,  such as factory and community centers in Aschaffenburg, the organizers 
illustrated the Nazi’s coercive control on micro and macro levels, linking the local to the 
national. The exhibition linked sculpture to the building program by showing that Nazi 
structures resulted in commissions for large scale freestanding works as well as bas reliefs.  
In the portion titled Malerei des deutschen Faschismus, wall labels directed 
viewers’ interpretation of the subject matter towards texts written by the organizers 
discussing laws and daily life inside the Third Reich. These texts hung next to the paintings 
and photographs of artworks in the galleries. In the section on programmatic painting, 
photographic reproductions of a fresco cycle depicting workers from the Berlin-
Schönebergby city hall (figure 8), painted by the Nazi artist Franz Eichhorst (1895-1948), 
were placed alongside texts promoting the notion of Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s 
community,  a racially charged ideology promoted by the Nazis to unify the German people 
through the Aryan race.151 In the catalogue the function of the imagery promoting the 




151 Bussmann, Kunst Im Dritten Reich: Dokumente Der Unterwerfung, 130 and 221. 
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important task in conveying and spreading this mystification. It tried to persuade the people 
to [the] superstition that they [Aryan Germans] had finally come to what was rightfully 
theirs’.”152 
A key artwork in the “Representation of the Farmer” section was Julius Paul 
Junghanns’s idyllic canvas Ploughing. Purchased by Adolf Hitler at the 1940 GDK, this 
image depicts a romanticized scene of a farmer, plough, and three horses, set against a 
sunlit terrain.153 In 1940, Junghanns’s painting had been lauded by the Nazi art critic 
Robert Scholz (1902-1981) as “great and simple in its understanding of man and animal in 
their common working and resting.”154 While Junghanns never joined the Nazi party, his 
paintings were included in the yearly Große Deutsche Kunstausstellungen from 1937 to 
1944 and were very popular among the Nazi elite.155 In the exhibition the image served to 
reinforce the curators’ social history narrative. Junghanns’s painting functioned to not only 
glorify farmers, but to promote a racially charged doctrine known as blut und boden (blood 
and soil). This theme carried over into the section on women that explored Nazism’s 
idealization of peasant women (figure 9) who worked the land and mothers who bore strong 
white, and physically fit children. Several messages were clear: the drive for a “pure” 
blooded Aryan nation; to populate the country, to wage more wars, and defend the 
 
152 Ibid., 130. This is the author’s translation, the original German is as follows: “Eine 
wichtige Aufgabe bei Vermittlung und Verbreitung dieser Mystifikation hatte die Kunst 
des deutschen Faschismus zu erfüllen, durch sie versuchte man das Volk zu dem 
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154 Peter Adam and Phyllis Freeman, Art of the Third Reich. New York: H. N. Abrams, 
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Fatherland; and avoidance of the suggestion that women work in the office or in industries 
(by contrast, although the formal and often times the ideological content is closely 
paralleled within Soviet and Nazi art, Soviet Socialist Realism placed women on near equal 
footing with men working in factories).  
Other depictions of women included nude mythological scenes, such as Ivo 
Saliger’s The Judgment of Paris or Adolf Ziegler’s famed triptych Die Vier Elemente (Four 
Elements) (figure 10). The organizers’ remarked on the importance of the nude in the 
tradition of history painting, particularly the 19th century, and that the mythological nudes 
prevalent throughout NS art continued this tradition.156 Two student curators, Christian 
Groß and Uwe Großman, wrote in the catalogue that the subject of mythology was used in 
paintings of women because it removed the nude figures from reality, historical reference, 
or contemporary likeness.157 Furthermore, they noted that although nudes made in the 19th 
century, for which these paintings were modeled after, were well crafted and exuded a 
sense of melancholy, the images of “National Socialism were unreflective, overconfident 
and showy.”158 
The last section on Nazi propaganda posters discussed how the media and mass 
cultural items reinforced the ideologies represented in architecture, sculpture, and painting. 
Although advertisements and propaganda imagery depicting work, from farmers to 
construction workers, and soldiers, would have hung throughout towns, magazines, and 
newspapers, the organizers did not construct a strong narrative of how the imagery would 
have been seen by the public. Moreover, they did not spend much time discussing the 
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content of the images. Rather, the section on posters centered on simply the fact that mass 
media conveyed Nazi ideas, including tropes such as Volksgemeinschaft, anti-Bolshevism, 
and anti-Judaism.  
In the short catalogue essay for this section, the student author Richard Grübling 
wrote that mass media, from films, photographs, caricatures, and poster were similar to the 
fine arts, because both were part of the Nazi propaganda machine.159 Essentially, Grübling 
argues that the only difference between explicit propaganda, as exhibited in posters, and 
fine arts, such as paintings or sculptures, was the medium and public access. Nevertheless, 
the exhibition made a key point regarding the National Socialist treatment of representation 
in fine art versus mass culture: the latter served as a vehicle of caricature and vilification 
of the racial, ethnic, sexual, and political “other.” Official painting and sculpture, instead, 
focused on the body beautiful, the family, and national values of the German people. 
Posters imagined the look and threat of the enemies of the people, including the Bolsheviks, 
Judaism, and political dissidents. One example, in the exhibition, is the 1941 poster Hinter 
den Feindmachten: der Jude (Behind the Enemy: The Jew) (figure 11), which depicts a 
Jewish businessman behind the flags of Germany’s enemies: The United Kingdom, Soviet 
Union, and United States. The poster caricatures the Jewish man by giving him a large nose 
(a visual signifier seen throughout anti-Jewish propaganda imagery), and the flags serve to 
promote the idea of a conspiracy against Germany between the Jews and the countries 
represented. 
Although the exhibition established that all art created for the Third Reich was 
propaganda, the final section demonstrated that the regime made a distinction between fine 
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art and items of visual culture which were created specifically to indoctrinate viewers. 
Nevertheless, concepts such as artistic agency, or the actual political beliefs and adherence 
of individual artists, was a methodology not yet broached in 1974. In sum, in framing the 
final section of the exhibition the organizers sought to demonstrate that official painting of 
the period was nonetheless questionable as art and creativity, precisely because it was so 
highly successful as state formulated propaganda. 
 
Critical Reactions 
After the exhibition closed in Frankfurt, it traveled throughout the Federal Republic. The 
exhibition first went to the Hamburg Kunstverein from December 21, 1974–February 2, 
1975. It later made stops at the Württembergischer Kunstervein in Stuttgart (February 20–
March 30, 1975), Stadtische Kunstsammlungen in Ludwigshafen (April 12–May 25, 
1975), Kunst und Museumsverein Wuppertal in Wuppertal-Elberfeld (June 8–July 13, 
1975), and the Haus am Waldsee in Berlin—where it officially ended on October 19, 
1975.160  
In the first eight weeks alone 36,000 people visited the Frankfurt Kunstverein.161 
In conjunction with the exhibition, public forums were organized to promote a dialogue 
about the images presented, and during its run the exhibition gained considerable media 
attention.162 Critical reactions came from all parts of the political spectrum, and issues 
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161 Heskett, “Art and Design in Nazi Germany.” 141. 
162 George Bussmann, “Press release of the Initiative against the Diffusion of NS Art, 
October 1974” in Betrifft: Reaktionen. Anlass: Kunst im 3. Reich – Docukmente der 
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arose with all aspects of the show from the layout to content. The display of previously 
censored Nazi art and documents created controversy throughout Germany as to the 
validity of these materials as art and/or as propaganda. While the exhibition organizers 
were not aiming to rehabilitate Nazi art or argue its artistic merit, there were a number of 
people in the public who felt that it was not bad art and worthy of some merit.163  
Though Hinz did not explicitly state it, one of his reasons for the advance piece in 
Der Spiegel may well have been to counter potential backlash from the Vereinigung der 
Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes (The Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime). Indeed, 
the group staged numerous protests in an attempt to stop the show.164 The association 
reasoned that there was no need for an exhibition on Nazi art and that these images offended 
those who had suffered under National Socialism.165 When the association’s demands that 
the exhibition be halted were not met, they requested that visitors be required to give their 
reasons for going and to be accompanied by a trained guide.166 These requests were denied 
because the organizing committee disagreed with their complaints, believing that these 
suggestions went against their duty to strip away the taboos surrounding the art of the Third 
Reich.167  
In his review of the show, four years after it opened in Frankfurt, British historian 
John Heskett assessed the overall critical reactions:  
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It is a weakness of most art exhibitions that little attempt is made to place 
the works in their social context. That the organizers of ‘Art in the Third 
Reich’ did so was an important step forward and necessary under the 
circumstance. But doubts were raised by the precise method used and 
therefore its wider validity, particularly the technique of simply juxtaposing 
art objects with information on the social context, and interpreting them 
solely in terms of that information. This may be useful in identifying 
ideological content, but there is danger that a work may have an ideological 
interpretation imposed upon it…One of the problems that I found visiting 
the exhibition was the difficulty of relating much of the imagery to the 
comment accompanying them.168 
 
Heskett added that visitors to the exhibition were “undoubtedly influenced by their 
awareness of its didactic nature and much of the reaction was conditioned by political 
opposition to, or support of, the basic concept presented.”169 In other words, the show did 
little to successfully educate the public.  
 Heskett took particular issue with the juxtaposition of photographs and texts with 
actual paintings, as well as the exclusive emphasis on socio-political histories versus 
artistic merit and style. He found it difficult to relate the imagery to the accompanying 
materials and commentary, because the layout obscured the ideas presented throughout the 
exhibition.170 One example he recounted was the placement of a 1936 photograph of a 
Bavarian landscape with farmers pulling a plow positioned next to Junghanns’s Ploughing. 
He wrote:  
The painting [Ploughing] was an obvious piece of idealization that bore 
little relationship to the practical realities of everyday rural life, but the 
photograph also aroused skepticism as to the extent that it represented the 
general reality of agricultural work in the Third Reich…This technique of 
juxtaposition was, it seemed to me, an imprecise tool that could all too easily 
 
168 Heskett, “Art and Design in Nazi Germany,” 141-142. 
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be challenged and thus cast doubt on the validity of more fundamental and 
serious purposes of the exhibition.171  
 
Essentially, Heskett took issue with the fact that neither the painting, nor the photograph 
portrayed an accurate representation of farm life–perhaps this issue had to do with the lack 
of discussion on how photography served as a curated form of Nazi propaganda. 
 Other critics also took issue with the emphasis on socio-political content over 
discussion of style or technique, and even the comparative methodologies. They noted that 
the show did not contextualize these works in the larger context of history painting or 
address how that genre was revived by totalitarian regimes in general. For example, the 
Rheinische Merkur newspaper explicitly noted the similarities in style between the 
naturalist-realism of Nazi history painting and Soviet Socialist Realism:  
The left-tainted intellectuals must in any case be very naïve, otherwise they 
would have noticed in time the boomerang of this exhibition. Everywhere 
one heard young men telling their wives that the art of the Soviet Union was 
exactly the same. Also on the sheets of [paper] on which visitors could set 
their opinion, one found nothing more frequent than references to the art of 
the Communist dictatorships.172  
 
Beginning with Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and during the 
1960s and 1970s scholarly texts compared the common political strategies of Nazism, 
Fascism, and Stalinist Communism.173 Thus, critics believed that the organizers had failed 
to address the obvious connection between the art created by each of these regimes. 
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Nevertheless, this content had been considered by the organizing committee and failed to 
take off. The curators feared that if they had included a comparison of Nazism and 
Stalinism within the exhibition it would interfere with their overall message. The exhibition 
intended to show how National Socialist art functioned as propaganda.174 It did not serve 
as a space to discuss the similarities between official Nazi art and that of other totalitarian 
regimes.  
 Despite the criticism surrounding the exhibition, it marked an end to the complete 
ostracization of National Socialist art. Many West Germans, particularly art historians, 
could or would not separate the art from propaganda, but some, such as the exhibition 
organizers were willing to confront them as documents pertaining to German history. 
Looking back on the project in a 1988 interview, George Bussmann spoke of the substantial 
risk they took in staging the exhibition.175 Not everyone saw it as decidedly antifascist, 
although this position was clear from the inception and central to its choice of objects, 
didactics, and layout.176 He added that a measure of its complexity was found in the 
conflicting attitudes he encountered with the organizing committee, especially given the 
urgency seen in the threat of the Hitlerwelle. He recalled a certain planning meeting, where 
the stakes were clear: 
A colleague at a meeting of the exhibition organizers had said that Nazi art 
was by no means just bad, but that some of pictures and sculpture were quite 
noteworthy…This was not just nostalgia, but a revaluation of this art 
without political sign. That was unbearable and unthinkable for me.177 
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Chapter Three: The Return of the Repressed 
 
After the polemics generated by Kunst im Dritten Reich: Dokumente der Unterwerfung, 
many visitors to the exhibition believed that the art of the Third Reich was sheer 
propaganda, and not art (although there were people who felt otherwise). During the 1980s, 
the distrust and dislike of Nazi imagery continued. But the collective need to lift the veil 
of historical amnesia prompted more studies on–and new attitudes toward–the art produced 
under National Socialism. Independently, yet significantly, in this regard, the United States 
government decided, in the mid-1980s, to return approximately 6,100 artworks to the West 
German government.  The discussions that took place among American officials to reach 
that decision, the subject of this chapter, indicated not only the changing attitude toward 
Nazi imagery some four decades after the fall of Hitler, but also of a perceived, newfound 
responsibility on the part of German institutions to manage their patrimony.  
These developments in the cultural realm occurred in tandem with more complex 
historiographical analyses of the Nazi period on the part of both German and American 
scholars. Revisionist assessments of collective German guilt and the exceptionalism of 
Nazi atrocities prompted new controversies, in particular the West German Historikerstreit 
(historians’ debate) of the late 1980s, which shook the academic establishment. 1983 
marked fifty years since Hitler’s rise to power. With the passage of time came distance 
from the regime and those directly responsible for the crimes it perpetuated. The lapses in 
memory, ebbing of guilt and need for atonement were epitomized by the so-called Bitburg 
controversy of 1985. That year, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech that, in 
effect, distanced himself and all West Germans from the atrocities committed by the Nazis. 
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The context was an event organized by the governments of the FRG and the United States 
to strengthen both their alliance and that of NATO.  
During a 1984 visit to the United States, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
asked President Ronald Reagan to join him on a visit to a German military cemetery, home 
to fallen American and German soldiers, for a symbolic wreath laying ceremony in the 
spring.178 Controversy ensued when the media revealed the Bitburg cemetery chosen for 
the ceremony did not have any American graves; instead, forty-nine SS soldiers were 
buried there. 179  Exacerbating the diplomatic missteps was the embarrassing fact the 
President’s visit with Chancellor Kohl did not include a scheduled stop at a concentration 
camp to honor victims of the Holocaust.180 
 In a March 21, 1985 press conference, regarding his forthcoming trip, Reagan stated 
that he would not visit a concentration camp, because “instead of reawakening 
memories…we should observe this as the day when, forty years ago, peace began.”181 He 
then commented upon and defended contemporary West Germans, “… none of them who 
were adults and participating in any way [in World War II were still alive]… very few… 
even remember the war… a guilt feeling [has] been imposed upon them, and I just think 
it’s unnecessary.” 182 His words served to absolve contemporary Germany of the atrocities 
of the Holocaust due to the generational gap. American Jews spoke out against the 
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President’s remarks and planned visit to Bitburg, notably Hyman Bookbinder, Washington 
representative of the American Jewish Committee, Elie Wiesel, chairman of the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Council, and Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the 
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.183 In an effort to save face, Reagan agreed to 
add on a visit to a concentration camp. Nevertheless, he once again ignited scandal, 
outrage, and pain when he described the SS men buried at Bitburg as, “victims of Nazism 
also…They were victims, just as surely as victims in the concentration camps…young 
soldiers were conscripted, forced into military service in the closing days of the Third 
Reich.”184 
  When the day came for Reagan and Kohl’s visit to Bitburg, the schedule allotted 
ten minutes for the wreath laying ceremony. No words were spoken at the cemetery.185 The 
West German government did little to reverse course or quell the negative perceptions. In 
the months leading up to the Bitburg visit, Chancellor Kohl remarked in a speech that his 
birth year meant he was too young to have participated in the abhorrent actions carried out 
by the Third Reich, exonerating him from any accountability, echoing Reagan’s opinion.186 
The two statemen’s public announcements in the months preceding the Bitburg visit 
indicated the growing movement away from the need for atonement.  
A year after the Bitburg controversy, West German historian Ernst Nolte published 
an editorial “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber 
nicht mehr gehalten werden konnte” (The Past That Will Not Go Away: A Speech That 
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Could Be Written but Not Delivered) in the conservative-liberal newspaper the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, which set out to lessen the crimes of the Holocaust. It inaugurated 
what came to be known as the Historikerstreit or historians’ debate over the exceptionalism 
of Nazi atrocities, especially its precisely executed, genocidal campaigns.187 Nolte claimed 
that the Holocaust was not unique, given the murderous Soviet reign of terror (what he 
referred to as the “Asiatic model”) and Francoist “white terror” (a genocide committed by 
the Nationalist faction during the Spanish Civil War and initial ten years of Francisco 
Franco’s rule). 188  The reaction was swift, most notably from Jürgen Habermas who 
countered, with his article Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie (On the Public Use of 
History) published in Die Zeit, that the issue was an attempt to “relativize” the crimes of 
the Holocaust through faulty moral equivalencies (such as Kohl’s and Reagan’s equation 
of the SS fallen to victims of the concentration camps) and failed to acknowledge the 
uniqueness of the Nazi Final Solution.189  
The Historikerstreit prompted a larger discussion among intellectuals as to how to 
write and record the rise of Nazism and the events of the Holocaust. Historians such as 
Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer contributed the articles “Plädoyer für eine 
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Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus” (A Plea for a Historicization of National 
Socialism) in the magazine Merkur and “Some Reflections on the Historicization of 
National Socialism” in Tel Aviv Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte, respectively.190  The 
dispute emphasized the growing tensions in the FRG as to how ordinary West Germans 
were to understand their history. Should a generation forty years removed from the fall of 
National Socialism continue to take responsibility for the sins of their parents and 
grandparents? Given the growing number of comparative studies on totalitarian regimes 
and genocides, some participants in the Historikerstreit asked why Germany should 
continue to represent the greatest, or singular, culpability for crimes against humanity. As 
the need for personal and generational atonement faded by the 1990s, as lessons on the 
Holocaust were embedded into German school curriculums, and as East and West became 
reunited, so too did attitudes change toward Nazi imagery and the German public’s ability 
to see it anew.  
Revisiting the German War Art Collection 
In 1982, just a few years before the Historikerstreit erupted, the United States government 
voted to repatriate a majority of the remaining artworks from the German War Art 
Collection. As noted in chapter one, a number of pieces had already been returned to 
Germany in 1951 while the rest of the collection remained under the care of the U.S. Army 
Center of Military History.191 The Army had distributed the artworks across the continental 
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United States, storing many in warehouses in Richmond, Virginia, and Pueblo, Colorado; 
others were displayed in United States Government buildings, including the Pentagon and 
Congress.192 Although some were put on display, most remained sequestered in deplorable 
conditions.193 Take, for example, the United States Army warehouse in Pueblo, Colorado, 
which, since 1972, housed three hundred paintings and various other crates filled with war 
paraphernalia and World War II ammunitions. Many of the canvases were severely 
damaged due to the lack of any preservation efforts taken by Army personnel.  Pieces were 
scattered around the warehouse or loosely packed in crates; some forty unframed canvases 
were leaned up against the concrete walls.194 These paintings depicted Nazi party rallies or 
National Socialist leaders, such as Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and others, in 
uniform.195 Individuals who visited the warehouses in Colorado and Virginia commented 
on the squalid conditions under which the paintings were kept.  
While the Army evidently cared little for the majority of the works in their care, 
there remained an interest in their holdings from students and World War II enthusiasts. 
Over the years, the Pueblo warehouse custodian, Ralph Martinez, took steps to preserve 
some of the artworks after he realized they appeared to be of historical value due to the 
increasing number of student visitors and historians to the warehouse each year. 196 
Martinez even erected a rope barrier in front of the paintings to keep visitors from touching 
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them, and later humidified the rooms by placing large water-filled tubs on the concrete 
floor to preserve the quality of the paint, which he noticed seemed to be drying out. Despite 
one man’s attempt to preserve these historical artifacts, the majority of the Army’s 
collection remained neglected until 1981.   
On September 23 of that year, the Committee on Armed Services of the United 
States House of Representatives convened to discuss Bill H.R. 3555, introduced by 
Congressman G. William Whitehurst [R-Virginia]. The bill aimed to authorize the 
repatriation of the German War Art Collection to the Federal Republic of Germany.197 This 
was not Whitehurst’s first time advocating for repatriation, as he previously sponsored a 
bill in 1978 which sanctioned the return of ten German naval paintings by the artist Claus 
Bergen to the FRG.198 The meeting did, however, mark the first time that Whitehurst, or 
anyone else, had proposed a full review of the materials in Army custody. 
In his arguments advocating for repatriation, Whitehurst paid particular attention to 
the issue of subject matter. He maintained that most of the 6,300 artworks were not overtly 
propagandistic, as they did not explicitly glorify Hitler or Nazi ideology.199 This differed 
vastly from a 1947 statement by Captain Gilkey: “If it [the trove of art] had been left in 
Germany, it would have been a potential threat to the world through future reinstallation 
and German misuse.”200Whitehurst acknowledged the concerns of the committee and the 
public, that to “send back art of an inflammatory nature . . . would glorify a loathsome 
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regime in German history and encourage a resurgence of the Nazi spirit.” 201   Yet, 
Whitehurst reasoned that because the artworks from the German War Art Collection had 
been displayed for some time in congressional committee and subcommittee rooms, at the 
Pentagon, in Army liaison offices, and even in his own office, they posed no threat as a 
whole.202  
Based on the paintings he had reviewed, Whitehurst concluded that they were not 
categorically “Nazi art,” but “war art,” showing the life of German military personnel under 
the best and the worst conditions, as indeed soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all nations 
experience it. Indeed, Marylou Gjernes, the art curator of the U.S. Army Center of Military 
History, echoed Whitehurst’s sentiments, but judged positively the artistic merits of many 
of the works: 
Included in the collection are oils, watercolors, pastels, drawings, woodcuts, 
lithos, etchings, and wood and metal sculpture. Four watercolors executed 
between 1904 and 1919 and attributed to Adolf Hitler are included. Some 
of the paintings and drawings are brilliant in conception and execution. 
They show by their artistry, color, and mood, the spirit of combat, and 
desolation, destruction, and tragedy of war. There are illustrations of the 
despair and boredom of the troops, general war scenes, portraits of soldiers 
as well as the military and political leaders, and numerous renderings of 
various scenes with no apparent political or military connotation 
whatever.203 
 
Adamant that the majority of works were not overtly political or propagandistic in nature, 
Gjernes and Whitehurst still proposed that all works in the collection be reviewed 
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according to strict criteria before their return. 204 Those items to remain in the United States 
included: 
a) Paintings which depict Nazi party emblems 
b) Paintings of leaders of the Nazi party hierarchy 
c) Paintings of convicted war criminals 
d) Paintings whose overall impression is to glorify Nazism 
e) Paintings attributed to Adolf Hitler 
f) Subjects deemed useful as historical or educational media for the U.S. 
Army and Air Force205 
 
Of the approximately 7,000 artworks in the army collection, 6,100 were deemed to not be 
explicitly emblematic of National Socialism and were repatriated to the FRG.206 Bill H.R. 
3555 demonstrated how the United States government (in the 1980s) rationalized the 
preservation of National Socialist art. Once considered to be the embodiment of 
totalitarianism, and genocide and a vehicle of hatred, these works were now given historical 
significance, with some examples even treated as worthy, as we have seen, in subject, style, 
and technique.207 In his testimony, Whitehurst additionally urged Congress to consider the 
positive diplomatic implications of repatriation, insisting that a show of good faith in West 
Germany’s ability to manage the artworks would bolster the alliance with the FRG against 
a potential “Soviet onslaught.”208  
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After the United States congressional committee reviewed the works in the 
collection, they officially transferred them to the West German government in January 
1983 with the stipulation that the latter would cover all transportation costs for their 
return.209 The artworks were not actually dispatched until 1986 due to issues surrounding 
copyright and good title once they were back in West Germany.210  All told, the return of 
art once perceived to be threatening demonstrates that, by the 1980s, the fear of these 
images’ power had largely receded, concerns over a Nazi resurgence in West Germany had 
subsided, and the FRG had proved itself to be not only a solid democracy, but an important 
bulwark against the Soviets.  
Although the FRG never explicitly expressed interest in repatriating the artworks, 
the government was grateful for their return. 211  Christoph Bruemmer, Deputy Press 
Secretary of the German Embassy in Washington, DC, made it clear that, although certain 
individuals saw aesthetic value in the works, the West German government viewed the 
artworks “as historical documents. . .We [FRG government officials] don’t see them so 
much as artistic achievements. . .[but] some people who have seen the pieces out of this 
collection have told me that you could think of them as having artistic merit.”212 To further 
drive the point home, Bruemmer affirmed that West Germany “doesn’t have plans to 
exhibit the paintings, only to keep them in archives and have them available to 
historians.”213 Once the works made their way back to Germany, the government placed 
them in the care of the Bavarian Army Museum in Ingolstadt, where they were once again 
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ignored and consigned to oblivion until the government could determine what to do with 
them.214 The repressed was literally returned, but it was not allowed to surface into German 
public consciousness.  
Although Kunst im Dritten Reich had reached a wide audience when it toured in 
West Germany, it included relatively few paintings and sculptures, as noted earlier. The 
inability to see the panoply of Nazi art–even as photographs of totalitarian atrocities had 
appeared in films, illustrated magazines, and newspapers for decades–shaped the 
complicated nexus of opinions surrounding the desire, or lack thereof, for its “unveiling.” 
Indeed, in a September 1986 article in Die Zeit, Petra Kipphoff questioned opinions about 
the art precisely because so few people had actually seen it firsthand, and thus could hardly 
judge it objectively 215 She denounced the West German government’s decision to hide 
away the repatriated German War Art Collection, stating that, although there had been talk 
of scholarly evaluation, the collection remained off limits.216 Implicitly arguing against a 
tout court rejection of all art created during the period, she gave the example of the artist 
Rudolf Belling, whose art was simultaneously glorified and denigrated by the Nazis having 
been exhibited in both the GDK and Entartete Kunst exhibitions: clearly one had to 
evaluate his work on a case by case basis.217 Urging the public to consider technical merit 
and subject matter through firsthand experience with the objects opened the door for the 
government to address how and when to show it.  That such art was realist in style did not 
help the cause for its appreciation, given the hegemony of modernist art and abstraction in 
the West during the Cold War: indeed the problem of realism or academic figurative art–
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perceived by art experts as retrograde and inherently doctrinaire–complicated the reception 




Chapter Four: The Power of Nazi Images  
 
Contemporaneous with the Bitberg controversy and the Historikerstreit, two influential 
private collectors on opposite sides of the Atlantic publicly made known their interest in 
acquiring and displaying National Socialist art, though for different reasons: the German 
chocolate magnate and museum founder Peter Ludwig (along with his wife, Irene 
Monheim), who lauded the talents of the committed Nazi, Arno Breker; and the American 
Mitchell Wolfson Jr. who valued what he perceived as the undeniable creativity involved 
in the creation of propaganda. Wolfson acquired Nazi ephemera, paintings and posters 
alongside those of other regimes and governments between the wars. Both collectors 
mounted defenses of their acquisitions on the basis of artistic merit, though Wolfson helped 
define another field entirely–that of visual culture, in which the hierarchies between high 
and low were overturned in favor of criteria that addressed both effectiveness, audience 
reception, and propaganda techniques. Their collecting practices ignited new debates and 
fostered more nuanced approaches toward the Nazi art, both within Germany and without.  
Although the West German government viewed the painting and sculpture of the 
Third Reich as purely historical artefacts and not works of fine art, Peter Ludwig (1925-
1996) felt otherwise. An art historian, voracious collector, head of a German chocolate 
empire, and philanthropist (whose name is found on numerous museums throughout 
Germany and Europe thanks to hallmark gifts from the Ludwigs, which founded the basis 
of the museum collections), Ludwig single-handedly attempted to rehabilitate at least some 
German art produced under Nazi auspices between 1933 and 1945, by championing the 
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work of Arno Breker (figure 12).218 Ludwig studied art history at the Mainz University, 
where he published his dissertation on Pablo Picasso, Das Menschenbild Picassos als 
Ausdruck eines generationsbedingten Lebensgefühls (Picasso's Image of Man as an 
Expression of a Generational Attitude Towards Life).219 During his time at the university, 
he met his wife Irene Monheim, heir to a German chocolate empire. In 1952, Ludwig was 
appointed managing director of Monheim Schokolade, based at Aachen, and in 1969 
became its chairman.220 This position gave him a lucrative income, and the couple amassed 
a large art collection including Pre-Columbian sculpture, Delft tiles,  porcelain, medieval, 
and classical art, Dada and Pop.221 It was reported that by the mid-1970s the Ludwigs were 
buying an average of one artwork a day. They were also public philanthropists, loaning 
artworks to museums throughout Germany and abroad; the loans later became permanent 
gifts and many museums changed their names in honor of their generosity.222 
Peter Ludwig’s presumed support of National Socialist visual culture made national 
news in 1986 after he commissioned Arno Breker (1900-1991) to render busts of him and 
his wife  with the intention of housing them in the Museum Ludwig in Cologne.223 Founded 
in 1976, the institution was established when the Ludwigs donated part of their collections 
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of 1960s and 1970s art, primarily American Pop Art, on the condition that the city build a 
museum to house the collection.224 The museum opened to the public in 1986. 
Breker was, notoriously, Adolf Hitler’s favorite artist, and received the most 
prestigious public commissions of the Third Reich. His neoclassical style is often 
considered the quintessential embodiment of National Socialist aesthetics, and he focused 
almost exclusively on heroic male nudes (figures 13 and 14) in poses of noble suffering or 
glorious battle. He also made a number of bronze portraits of Nazi officials, including 
Hitler (figure 15). The physical perfection of the sculpted bodies, especially when rendered 
in white marble, embodied the Aryan ideal and the fight for the supremacy of the pure 
German race. His 1939 sculptures of Der Wehrmacht (The Army) and Die Partei (The 
Party) were made to adorn the entryway of the Reich Chancellery, (figure 16) designed by 
Albert Speer, one of the most important buildings in Berlin and the symbolic center of Nazi 
power.  
Despite his successful career during the Third Reich and close relationship with 
Hitler (figure 17), Breker rehabilitated his public persona in the postwar period. In his 
denazification trial he was judged a fellow traveler or “follower,” rather than an “offender,” 
meaning he was deemed as sympathetic and cooperative with the Third Reich, but not a 
militant Nazi, profiteer or criminal. Dr. Helene Vogt, chair of the board that heard his case 
in 1948, noted that Breker “had received only unimportant profits from his activities.”225 
His punishments were to pay a small fine of one hundred deutsche marks and a ban from 
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exhibiting his artworks in museums.226 The verdict resulted in the impression that Breker 
played a minimal role within the Nazi Party, but this was not the case; it also implied that 
admired artists were somehow by nature and profession, incapable of serious misdeeds. In 
fact, he was not only a member of the Nazi party, but a “political leader” or high ranking 
official.227  
As Jonathan Petropolous’s research has established, this position afforded him a 
lavish lifestyle, including an industrial complex-turned-workshop in Wriezen, sixty miles 
southeast of Berlin, staffed with sculptors, laborers of various skill levels, and French and 
Italian prisoners of war. 228  Hitler provided Breker with approximately one million 
Reichsmark salary, and a number of residences within Germany and Paris, including the 
Aryanized Paris residence of the Jewish-American Helena Rubinstein.229 In addition to 
these amenities and his high salary, Breker had a steady stream of bronze throughout the 
war; bronze was not only a rare commodity, but the practice of casting in bronze had been 
prohibited by the Reich in 1940.230 Postwar scholars have posited that the majority of 
Breker’s material came from melted down French statues.231  Having received a light 
sanction, Breker subsequently enjoyed a successful postwar career, designing sculptures 
and reliefs for buildings in Düsseldorf, Munich, Essen, and Siegen; he even completed a 
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1979 bronze portrait bust of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (figure 18). Breker nevertheless 
remained a controversial figure and many, rightly, considered his work to be directly linked 
to, and evocative of, the genocidal regime.232 The decision of Ludwig, who was not only a 
major collector of modernist art, but also a museum founder–to commission the two bronze 
busts, rendered in a conservative, realist style similar to that of Breker’s effigies of Adolf 
Hitler and other Nazi officials, generated a public outcry.   
The controversy was less about style than it was about the artist’s historical record 
and involvement with National Socialism. He had worked directly with and for the Führer 
and created monuments to the Nazi regime and he was rewarded handsomely. Many in the 
FRG could not separate Breker’s art from his personal biography. The shadow of his 
history, not to mention how his neoclassical style served the ideology of the regime, could 
not be ignored. Moreover, Ludwig released a statement voicing his affinity for Breker’s 
entire body of work on aesthetic grounds, affirming his belief that the art created in 
Germany from 1933 to 1945 should no longer be excluded from art museums.233  
Art historians, such as Ursel Berger, Director of the Georg Kolbe Museum, had 
long been opposed, as a matter of principle, to the reincorporation of Nazi pictures into 
public art institutions.234 In 1983, when Breker’s work was shown in Paris at the Centre 
Pompidou, she reacted by calling him “a non-artist.”235 The general consensus among 
Berger and her West German peers in the 1980s was that the art of the Nazi era should not 
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be displayed in art museums or even special exhibitions because it was not art and gave it 
underserved imprimatur.236 Likewise, in reaction to the Ludwig controversy, the West 
German graphic artist and lawyer Klaus Staeck joined forces with museum directors, 
curators, and artists, signing a protest against putting Nazi art in museums.237 They noted 
Breker’s heinous past and called for a stop of the reevaluation of Nazi art as fine art. In 
effect, the Ludwig controversy became a lightning rod for a debate among art historians 
and journalists as to the fate and value of art from the Nazi era and the dictated style of 
academic realism and faux romanticism associated with it. 
Ludwig responded by comparing the rejection of National Socialist artworks by 
curators and art historians to the Nazi censorship of modern art–a false analogy given the 
specific racial grounds for that censorship and its use as a means to repress civil liberties, 
free expression and incite violence.238 He argued that critics should look beyond its Nazi 
past and judge the artworks based on their technical and aesthetic qualities alone, focusing 
the issue solely on the merits–or lack thereof–of Nazi art. 239 Critics felt that acknowledging 
any kind of artistry was akin to absolution and would erase or trivialize Germany’s Nazi 
history.240 It should come as no surprise, then, that many in the art world could not perceive 
any redeeming qualities in the style or subjects of official art produced under the regime or 
attempt to discern them. In their eyes, such imagery only operated as propaganda with 
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heinous implications. Nonetheless, Ludwig’s comments broke a taboo, and gave 
permission to others to voice their appreciation of academic figuration, bucolic native 
landscapes, and genre painting of a homogenous and largely rural society. Many believed 
that art should be isolated from politics and based solely on the visual experience.  
Disingenuously, Arno Breker later in life told an interviewer that “his sculpture. . . 
has nothing to do with politics. . .for good art is above politics.”241 Such a commonly held 
view skirted the obvious–that some “good” art (and talented artists) could also be excellent 
propaganda. The number of commissions Breker received from 1945 to 1986 more than 
proves that, while many West German art collectors and academics condemned Nazism, 
they were comfortable with the academic realism and other conservative figurative styles 
that it promoted and dismissed opinions that it could only be seen as expressive of the 
beliefs of Third Reich. Such was the opinion of U.S. Congressman Whitehurst, when he 
stated that the works of Nazi art he had seen exhibited great technical prowess; he 
considered them to be “very, very good.”242 
In the end Ludwig backtracked, saying he was misquoted and never intended to 
display the Breker busts in the newly opened Cologne Museum. Instead, the work remained 
in his private collection until his death. Interestingly, the Breker busts are today housed 
outside of Germany on a long term-loan from the Ludwigs’ foundation, the Peter und Irene 
Ludwig Stiftung, Aachen, to the Ludwig Museum in Budapest, Hungary (founded by the 
Ludwigs in 1989).243 Although Peter Ludwig did not commission any additional works by 
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Breker or collect other Nazi artworks (although there are some accounts that he owned one 
other Breker work), his vocal support of Breker’s rehabilitation shook not only the West 
German art historical community but the nation as a whole.244 Peter and Irene Ludwig 
remained a controversial couple for the remainder of their lives, yet their avid passion for 
collecting art and founding museums throughout the world continued.  
 As for Arno Breker, his rehabilitation in the 1980s may have been epitomized by 
the Ludwig controversy but it was not limited to this singular patron or to German 
collectors. In fact, a number of art historians, including the American John Zavrel, voiced 
their support of his work. Zavrel maintained that Breker was “the greatest living sculptor 
in the classical tradition of this century.”245 Perhaps the most striking example of support 
for the artist occurred in 1985 when Marco and Joe Bodenstein, Breker’s postwar art 
dealers, founded the private Arno Breker Museum in Schloss Nörvenich near Cologne. 
With more and more people voicing their support for the artist the museum provided a 
space where fans could gather to see Breker’s recent or surviving works. Nevertheless, by 
the 1990s the museum was renamed The Museum of European Art and the collection 
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expanded to include surrealist artists such as Salvador Dalí and Viennese Fantastic Realist 
painter Ernst Fuchs.246  
The growing debates over the validity of  Nazi art in the 1980s, coupled with the 
Ludwig controversy, reinforced the anxiety throughout the FRG that if any art tinged by 
National Socialism entered into public art museum collections or temporary exhibitions 
then the art could be seen as relativizing and thereby mitigating the impact of the Nazi 
atrocities.247 Although instances such as the Ludwig controversy demonstrated that artists 
and artworks tied to the Third Reich had supporters within the Federal Republic, there was 
still no clear resolution about what to do with the stock of art from the Great German Art 
Exhibitions under government care, and how to navigate the blurry and fluctuating dividing 
line–and value judgements–between art and propaganda.   
 
Propaganda “Arts”  
While the Federal Republic of Germany began to question when, where, and how to 
consider the aesthetic merits of Nazi art, an American collector staked his claim to 
evaluating and appreciating the aesthetic power of propaganda. Be it fine arts, decorative 
arts, or graphic design, the Miami-based Mitchell (Micky) Wolfson Jr. (b.1939) used the 
heretofore oxymoronic term “propaganda arts” to acknowledge that images of persuasion 
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must have degrees of aesthetic worth or interest in order to successfully persuade.  In 1986, 
he founded the Wolfsonian Foundation (in 1995 it became the Wolfsonian Museum of 
Florida International University) to house his extensive art holdings and began publishing 
The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts.248 Wolfson’s private art collection served 
as the basis for the foundation and journal: he focused on British, German, Dutch, Italian, 
and American paintings, posters, graphics, periodicals, and decorative objects created 
between 1870 and 1945.249  
The breadth and choice of the acquisitions across mediums, scale of production 
(both one of a kind and mass-produced items), high art and popular culture makes the 
Wolfson collection and the criteria that inspired it one of the first examples of what is now 
commonly referred to as “visual culture.” It levels hierarchies of taste, training, audience, 
and reception and considers the entirety of visual images in a larger socio-economic and 
cultural context. Moreover, it argues that each of these domains embodies varying levels 
of creative decisions, mastery of materials, and qualitative discernment. Nazi and Fascist 
memorabilia make up the bulk of the collection. Comprised of artifacts, sculptures, 
paintings, books, postcards, posters, medals, and household appliances, Wolfson’s 
collection is unified not by style (though there is a preponderance of what can be called art 
deco or machine aesthetic design in the arts of the interwar period), theme, or medium, but 
 
248 Peyton Skipworth, “Mitchell Wolfson Jr.: Collecting for the Wolfsonian.” The Journal 
of the Decorative Arts Society 1850 - the Present 30 (2006) 137. Accessed April 8, 2019. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41805889 
249 Victor Margolin, “Micky Wolfsons Cabinet of Wonders: From Private Passion to 
Public Purpose.” Design Issues 13, no. 1 (1997): 68. https://doi.org/10.2307/151158868  
 85 
rather by the ways in which visual culture communicates its relationship to the political 
ideologies and socio-economic factors whence it came.250  
 The youngest child of Frances and Mitchell Wolfson Sr., Micky Wolfson Jr. came 
from a wealthy Jewish American family. His mother was an artist and activist and his father 
built a career as an entrepreneur and philanthropist.251 The Jr. Wolfson attended boarding 
school and later Princeton University in New Jersey and Johns Hopkins School for 
Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C.252 After graduate school, he joined the 
foreign service in 1966 and later served as the U.S. Vice Consul in Genoa, Italy. 253 
Following a short-lived marriage and a brief career organizing art exhibitions in Europe, 
Wolfson devoted his life solely to the collecting of modernism, funded by the sale of his 
father’s business in 1983.254 There are substantial holdings devoted to Art Nouveau or the 
Italian Stile Libertà; but Wolfson soon understood that twentieth century mass politics and 
design were both profoundly influenced by rapid technological advances. Perhaps most 
importantly, the interwar period saw the advent of mass production. For these reasons Mr. 
Wolfson was attracted to art-objects and artistic criteria that embodied the response to the 
numerous changes occurring socially and politically. 
Wolfson’s collection of formerly taboo items, namely those of a Nazi origin, 
includes war posters (figure 19), banners (figure 20), uniforms, anti-Semitic posters, and 
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racist caricatures. It could easily be assumed that someone amassing a large collection of 
these materials had neo-Nazi ties or sympathies; however, because Mr. Wolfson was both 
Jewish and American, his purchase of these materials–and desire to seek them out–quelled 
any fears. Some authors, such as the American scholar of Russian constructivism Victor 
Margolin, commented that it was strange that a Jewish man collected Nazi and Fascist art, 
but Wolfson’s background can readily explain his drive to gather these materials and make 
them available for study.255 As Joel Hoffman explained:  
Wolfson compellingly argues that the recording of history is necessarily prejudiced, 
and no written account has provided a satisfactory explanation of Hitler’s rise to 
power. Artifacts, on the contrary, he feels, ‘don’t lie,’ but rather hold the power to 
provide answers to this and other historical conundrums.256 
 
Wolfson himself stated “I’m not trying to influence or impose an interpretation on the 
viewer’s encounter with the collection. I’m simply the agent of this encounter.”257 His 
interest in Nazi and Fascist objects lay in what they represented and how they represented 
it. Driven by an  educational mission, he  argued for their display as artefacts of historical 
importance.258 Reviewers of the Wolfsonian collection have stated that the fascination with 
Nazi and fascist objects is “justified. . .because of his [Wolfson’s] missionary zeal to 
present them as reminders of oppressive political ideologies.”259 But Wolfson was also 
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keen to show what he called “analogies,” that is, where overlaps occur in the means and 
imagery of messaging. An early collector of Italian Fascist-era art, Wolfson understood 
that modernist design, painting, and graphic arts thrived under Mussolini and thus 
totalitarian art was not always equated with retrograde art.  He also perceived the role of 
propaganda in the art of the New Deal. In a 1992 newspaper interview, he explained his 
motivations:  
Never doubt that we have a mission and that we are revolutionaries. This 
foundation is meant to influence the way people think about history and art; 
we are resolved to make a difference. . . I’m didactic and I’m very interested 
in analogies. And I don’t want to be fashionable —that’s why I chose the 
word propaganda. I am determined to rid the world of oppression, 
misfortune, and misinformation.260 
 
The combination of ephemera and art challenged traditional art historical methodologies. 
Although similar collections of ephemera existed in libraries and archives such as the 
Library of Congress in Washington, DC or the Imperial War Museum in London, the term 
“propaganda arts” made Wolfson a pioneer in the new fields of “visual culture” and 
“material culture.”261 In the first edition of The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda 
Arts, editor Pamela Johnson wrote of the journal and, in effect, the collection’s mission:  
Within this journal, The Wolfson Foundation creates a forum for scholars 
to explore decorative and propaganda arts, 1875-1956- ubiquitous arts that 
shaped our parents and grandparents and, by extension, our own profound 
emotions and thoughts. Social, cultural, and intellectual history are 
implicated with art history. The journal will encompass a wide range of 
theory as experts furnish, with special emphasis on international and cross-
cultural influences. Thus far, just one fact of our being is problematic: the 
focus on propaganda. What do we mean by propaganda arts? A succinct 





general, remember, definitions are odious … Even more so with the upstart 
of propaganda arts, only acknowledged in this century.262 
 
Few people had earlier voiced the opinion that items of explicit propaganda, such as 
posters, postcards, and banners, held aesthetic value–they were simply valued as 
collectable items. What Micky Wolfson, his collection, and the subsequent journal did was 
elevate these materials and create a forum for the discussion of their historical importance. 
Scholars such as Peggy Loar have written about the cultural importance of the Wolfsonian 
collection: 
One of the ways in which a civilization defined itself is in its material 
culture; its infrastructure, architecture, art, furnishings, tools, technologies, 
ephemera. Through objects, cultures are recorded, providing us with 
tangible evidence concerning transformations in values and politics.263 
 
Although no one, including Wolfson, disputed the inherently evil and oppressive content 
of Nazi propaganda, the scholars working with his collection and contributing to his 
journal, analyzed how and why it was so convincing. Although Americans such as Captain 
Gordon Gilkey and the organizers of Kunst im Dritten Reich had argued this same point, 
Wolfson opened up the realm of aesthetics and the agency of artists and audiences. 
Specifically, he moved the aesthetic issue beyond fine art to one of design: that the 
collected objects served to represent the history of graphic design and decorative arts. In 
assessing Wolfson’s collection, John Heskett discussed how it altered the previous 
historiography of design:  “Design histories of this period have separated the two phases 
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on a very simplistic basis: the Weimar Republic is depicted as a flowering of modern design 
that ended when Hitler came to power; the Third Reich is generally ignored.” 264  He 
continued:   
The assumption that the Nazi regime engendered only work of little value 
is untenable, I would argue, since it completely underestimates two factors. 
First, designs of high caliber continued to be produced in the Third Reich: 
a reprehensible ideology does not necessarily produce inferior design and 
creativity can flourish in evil conditions. Second, when used for political 
ends, artifacts serve purposes reaching far beyond the form, function, and 
meanings attributed to them in the processes and practices of design.265 
 
Heskett concluded that Wolfson’s collection formed the basis of one of the most informed 
and complex analyses of the Third Reich’s deliberate aesthetic choices, choices that not 
only yielded a unified propaganda platform designed to suit their specific political 
ideologies, but one delivered precisely because of their visual appeal and sophistication. 
 Wolfson amassed his collection through sheer ingenuity, scavenging estate sales 
and thrift shops and tracking down artists and their heirs across the globe.266 Profiles on 
the collector have noted that he often travels the world, talking his way into people’s homes 
to see what they have. One profile from 1993 noted:  
For him, every purchase is an adventure, every trip a voyage of 
discovery…He would rather trek to an Indonesian village and talk a family 
out of a rare book on the Dutch occupation than deal with an auction house. 
It's too easy to browse through a catalog, circle an item and make a bid. His 
first choice is to find an heir or the artist himself, go to his house, meet the 
fellow, sit down and have tea and ask, "What's in your closets? What's under 
your bed? What's over there?" He will open a cabinet and say, "I know you 
have something for me. I know you're hiding something from me." . . . On 
a typical outing, he would befriend the local barber, who would tell him 
about so-and-so's mother who had this or that, and off he would go to knock 
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on the door. "And they let him in," says Lea Nickless, his collections 
assistant. "I seldom see him fail when he puts his mind to something. He's 
so single-minded, so strong-willed, so persuasive and charming. He knows 
how to make things happen."267 
 
Wolfson’s equitable attitude toward objects of varying worth, the  desire to learn, and the 
realization that families held on to what might be considered taboo material, directed his 
collecting.268 That Wolfson was able to travel the globe and collect these objects implies 
that a number of people saw value–and shame–in these items, at least enough to keep them 
in their attics or in the back of thrift stores. Despite Wolfson’s globetrotting ways and the 
growing interest in his collection within the United States–as well as the related museum, 
the Wolfsoniana, which he founded in Italy–there appears to be little attention paid to his 
work within Germany.269 Wolfson certainly amassed some of the Nazi materials in his care 
from within the FRG–numerous newspaper articles speak of his trips to Europe. 270 
Undoubtedly, an America was able to rehabilitate Nazi art and propaganda under the value 
system of visual culture precisely because the project did not unfold in Germany under the 
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When the 6,100 Nazi artworks were returned to the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
government was at a loss for what to do with them. Instead of welcoming their return, the 
FRG hid them in a warehouse with no plans for use or exhibition. Despite the growing 
research conducted on the Nazi period and all of the voices and opinions which came out 
of the historians’ dispute and the Ludwig controversy, the art of the Third Reich remained 
concealed and largely ignored.  
In 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany founded the Deutsches Historisches 
Museum (German History Museum) in West Berlin. 271  A permanent location for the 
museum was not established until after German reunification in 1990, when the buildings 
and collections of the GDR’s Museum für Deutsche Geschichte (Museum of German 
History) were transferred to the care of the Deutsches Historisches Museum. The museum 
took over the historic Zeughaus, built in 1695, to create a permanent location in Berlin’s 
Mitte district. It aimed  to encompass all of German history with the hopes of developing 
a unified national heritage after German reunification. The creation of a national museum 
marked a new moment of reflection, as the FRG had remained wary of all notions of 
nationalism following the fall of the Third Reich.272 In order to move past the negative 
connotations associated with interest or pride in the German past, a range of scholars and 
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scientists worked together on narrative installations and exhibitions that created an 
atmosphere of reflection and remembrance.273 
The culture of remembrance, compared to the culture of atonement, was a result of 
the nation’s complicated history with its Nazi past, and evolved in the decade following 
reunification. It led to increased public access to National Socialist cultural material.  
Instead of fearing Nazi imagery, scholars and academics used it to keep certain memories 
and lessons relevant. In 2007, the government transferred the care of the German War Art 
collection, along with a number of other Nazi items in their warehouse, to the Deutsches 
Historiches Museum. Today, many of these artworks and objects are on view as a part of 
the museum’s permanent exhibition: Deutsche Geschichte vom Mittelalter bis zum 
Mauerfall (German History from the Middle Ages to the Fall of the Berlin Wall) (figures 
21, 22, 23). The displays are intended not just for Germans but for tourists and citizens of 
other countries, as befitting the re-unified city of Berlin’s new international status.274  
By placing the art produced under National Socialism within the context of an 
exhibition on German history, the museum nonetheless passed a value judgment. Only in 
the past ten years has Nazi art been exhibited in German art museums. In 2012 the Haus 
der Kunst opened the cultural policy exhibition Histories in Conflict: Haus der Kunst and 
the Ideological Uses of Art, 1937-1955.  This exhibition explored the legacy of the 
museum, from the center of the National Socialist art world to its rehabilitation in the 
postwar. Most importantly the exhibition served to showcase how the museum has 
confronted its tainted history: through the 1996 implementation of a historical documents 
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installation, publications, the opening of Historical archives in 2005, and the establishment 
of the HDK internet database in 2011. 
Seventy-five years after the fall of the Third Reich, National Socialist visual culture 
remains a contested subject, especially in Germany. Articles such as Anna Larkin’s “Nazi 
art on show: Is Germany ready to look again?,” published on DW.com, highlight the storied 
history of Nazi art within Germany and the ongoing tensions surrounding the subject.275 
Despite the continued taboo of Nazi imagery and the careful presentation of Nazi visual 
culture, it still has the power to instill fear and violence. Take for example the use of the 
swastika and the rise of neo-Nazism in the GDR (and in present day-throughout Europe 
and America): no symbol of the Third Reich was, or is, more feared. Although studies have 
shown that many early neo-Nazis in the GDR did not understand what the swastika meant, 
they knew it was illegal and spray-painting it on buildings was an act of rebellion.276 The 
fact that the GDR did not undergo an extensive denazification program (the view was that 
communism had saved Germany and members of the Communist resistance were made 
heroes), resulted in an absence of denazification education. Citizens of the GDR were not 
taught why Nazism was evil, only that it was. This lack of education led to the rise of neo-
Nazism in Germany and abroad. Today, as neo-Nazism continues to grow not only in 
Germany but also Europe and the United States, the importance of understanding the power 
of images is all the more relevant. Take for example, the twenty-nine Berlin police officers 
who were suspended in September 2020 for disseminating 126 Nazi or violent images, 
including pictures of swastikas and a doctored image of a current-day refugee in a gas 
 
275 Anna Larkin, "Nazi Art on Show: Is Germany Ready to Look Again?: DW: 
06.10.2020." DW.COM. June 10, 2020. Accessed October 28, 2020. 
https://www.dw.com/en/nazi-art-on-show-is-germany-ready-to-look-again/a-55163334. 
276 Eric Brothers, “Issues Surrounding the Development of the Neo-Nazi Scene in East 
Berlin.”  European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe, 33, no. 2 (Autumn 2000), 45. 
 94 
chamber.277 In 2020, the swastika remains a highly charged symbol that stands for the 
violent, racist ideologies heralded by the Third Reich. Given the prevalence of neo-Nazism, 
it is easy to wonder if Germany, or the world, really is ready to look at Nazi art again, and 
if so, perhaps, for the foreseeable future, audiences will need to be made ready. 
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Monument, Fine Arts and Archives specialist with the Historical Properties Division, 
Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater. In John Paul Weber. The 
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the Städel Museum in Frankfurt on 6 December 1946. In John Paul Weber. The German 
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Figure 15: Arno Breker Portrait bust of Adolf Hitler, unknown date. Bronze, unknown 
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